# NATO COHESION DA

## CORE

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#### NATO unity deters Chinese invasion of Taiwan

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[Amrita Jash, "Unity on Ukraine war deters China," Taipei Times, 3-27-2022, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2022/03/27/2003775514, accessed 6-4-2022]

Unity on Ukraine war deters China

Undoubtedly, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has provided Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) with the biggest opportunity in disguise to scrutinize the reaction of the international community. For Xi, it comes at the right time and, to some extent, as the only point of reference for his own permutation and combinations of “unification” tactics toward Taiwan.

The Russia-Ukraine crisis has put forward the best worst-case scenario for Xi for assessing miscalculations, and the kind of responses and countermeasures that one can expect from the international system.

Unlike for any other leader, the lessons Xi can draw from the Ukraine crisis are significant because they can be linked to any form of China’s future adventurism in Taiwan.

The US Department of Defense in 2020 notably said that the Chinese military is “likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force.”

China’s increasing aggressive posture has only added to speculation over China’s plans to invade Taiwan.

In January, Chinese Ambassador to the US Qin Gang (秦剛) issued a stern warning, saying that the US could face “military conflict” with China over the status of Taiwan.

If this is the case, then the Ukraine crisis aptly serves as a litmus test for Beijing.

Putin’s assault on Ukraine is vital for Xi’s calculations in two ways:

First, there are diverging perceptions of Ukraine’s sovereignty in Kyiv and Moscow. Ukraine considers itself a sovereign nation, while Putin is inclined to adopt a “Soviet Union mentality.”

On similar terms, Xi’s actions dovetail China’s “Middle Kingdom mentality” under the “Chinese dream” of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” through “reunification with Taiwan.”

The logic is that of an “unfinished business” of getting foreign territories “back” into one’s geopolitical orbit — Ukraine for Putin and Taiwan for Xi.

Second, and most importantly, there is the leadership factor, wherein Putin’s Russia appears synonymous with Xi’s China — with the countries respective leaders being the chieftain of all things under their autocratic political apparatus.

While similarity between Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be drawn in a linear fashion, strong deductions can be made with regard to China’s behavior toward Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

That is, for China, and Xi in particular, the big lessons will be drawn from a careful reading of the international community’s reaction toward what Putin calls Russia’s “special military operation” aiming to “demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine” under the logic that “Russia cannot feel safe, develop and exist with a constant threat emanating from the territory of modern Ukraine.” The outcome has so far been international condemnation and boycotts of Russia, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU — resulting in Russia becoming a “pariah” state.

In contrast to full economic embargoes on countries such as North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Syria, the US has adopted a selective approach on Russia, imposing measures in a phase-by-phase manner. The US Office of Foreign Assets Control has imposed financial sanctions and restrictions on a majority of Russian oligarchs and state-owned banking and financial service providers, and added various Russian banks, as well as Putin and many of his associates, to the asset control office’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

The US Department of Commerce has targeted Russia’s oil refining sector with stringent export controls and identified 91 entities that support Russian military activities — a measure to cut off Moscow’s access to US goods it needs to sustain its military aggression against Ukraine.

Furthermore, the US has imposed an import ban on Russian alcoholic beverages, seafood and nonindustrial diamonds.

To deter Russia, the US has also imposed sweeping export controls on Belarus, which supports Russia, as a preventive measure to ensure that technology, software and other goods used in the defense, aerospace and maritime sectors are not passed on from Minsk to Moscow.

The EU’s sanctions on Russia include financial restrictions, an assets freeze, bans on Russian planes flying in EU airspace and landing at EU airports, a ban on transactions with the Russian central bank, a ban on seven Russian lenders from the SWIFT bank-to-bank messaging system, and suspensions of Russian state-media Russia Today and Sputnik, as well as individual sanctions against Putin and his associates. The bloc also imposed individual and economic sanctions on Belarus.

Joining the US and EU, Japan imposed sanctions on Russian and Belarusian officials and oligarchs, as well as on Russian organizations and companies, and it is discussing a ban on exports of oil refining equipment to Russia and dual-use products to Belarus.

However, unlike the US, Japan remains reluctant to close its airspace to Russian planes.

On March 11, the US along with its NATO allies, the G7 and the EU, revoked Russia’s “most-favored nation” status — one of the hardest blows to the already downgraded Russian economy.

Germany halted the certification of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to condemn Russia’s actions against Ukraine.

These international sanctions and measures are aimed at weakening Russia’s will to fight and putting Moscow in a difficult position by isolating it.

With the value of the ruble plummeting, the international community’s economic boycott of Moscow holds significant repercussions for domestic instability in Russia, which will be fostered by the growing financial crisis and Moscow’s isolation from the international system.

However, the sanctions have so far failed to deter Russia’s military actions; they have only emboldened Putin’s aggressive posture on Ukraine.

It is noteworthy though that the global backlash against Russia carries a strong message for China.

That is, if China plans to take Taiwan by force, it will have to be ready for the punitive measures. Can China afford isolation, especially when China wants to take the “center stage,” as outlined by Xi at the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2017?

That question acts as a red flag for Beijing.

In the context of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, it is also noteworthy that while major powers are not reluctant to impose sanctions and build up their defenses, they are hesitant to otherwise confront Russia, or even to engage NATO to do so.

While the US and its allies have called Putin the “aggressor,” no one seeks to confront Russia directly, as evidenced by US President Joe Biden saying: “Our forces are not engaged and will not engage in the conflict with Russian forces in Ukraine. Our forces are not going to Europe to fight [in] Ukraine, but to defend our NATO allies in the event that Putin decides to keep moving west.”

This brings in a potential miscalculation for China.

Can the US’ reluctant posture to fight Russia over Ukraine be applied in the case of a Chinese adventure in Taiwan?

The answer lies in the US’ policy of “strategic ambiguity” over Taiwan, meaning that Washington is deliberately vague about what it would do if China were to attack the nation.

However, this vagueness leaves room for the US to come to Taiwan’s defense.

Giving some clarity, Biden in October last year answered the question whether “the US would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack by China” by saying bluntly: “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.”

Taiwan holds severe reputational costs for the US; it cannot afford to act reluctantly against any Chinese action, but would have to retaliate.

Hence, taking copious notes of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, China under Xi will be cautious and calibrated in its behavior toward Taiwan.

It disturbs China’s larger geopolitical plans that there is a growing united front between the US and Europe — with the crisis in Ukraine bridging the gap.

If this united front strengthens, it will not only be a debacle for China’s global ambitions; it will also have ramifications for China’s plans for Taiwan.

Besides, Taiwan will be a much harder bargain for China. At this juncture, Beijing — given its leanings toward Moscow — cannot afford to be caught in the crosshairs of the US and Europe.

#### NATO inherently resists tech changes- pursuing consensus consumes significant time and resources even if it fails

Gojowsky, 18 -- U.S. Army officer

[Torsten; Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer; Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer; and Sebastian Koegle is a German officer; Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer, "Resistance to Innovation in NATO," Strategy Bridge, 8-16-2018, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato, accessed 6-4-2022]

Resistance to Innovation in NATO

Military leaders need to understand the symbiotic relationship between risk-taking and innovative progress. It may be commonly assumed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—one of the most durable and best-funded multinational defense organizations in history—has sufficient communication systems in order to operate effectively as an alliance of many disparate forces. One might then also assume that NATO-member special operations forces—the elite units of the alliance—have the best and most effective communication systems to coordinate and react to crises rapidly. However, this is not the case. If a crisis were to occur today, communication across the partner forces would be difficult. Technological solutions to these problems do exist and could be implemented with relative ease. Why are they unlikely to be adopted? The authors argue that institutional resistance to innovation at NATO is driven by the inherent characteristics of managing and maintaining a large, heterogeneous alliance among sovereign entities. This resistance can only be overcome if decisive, flexible, and adaptive military leaders are bold enough to allow an organization to accommodate new, sophisticated technologies. Otherwise innovation in the military grinds to a halt. Solving problems like this will not be easy, but it is necessary for NATO to adapt to the rapidly changing strategic environment and technological landscape in which it finds itself.

Innovative technologies that can effectively connect multiple NATO special operations forces, such as multilateral online and offline mapping, military radio controlling, text messaging, targeting, calling for fire, etc. already exist. Currently, the Tactical Assault Kit application for Android and Windows allows for all of these capabilities. The Tactical Assault Kit platform permits for a wide range of methods for establishing connectivity, even blending military satellite communication and commercial equipment. The Tactical Assault Kit communication system has been field tested by U.S., Norwegian, and Danish special operations forces in support of operations against ISIS. NATO special operations forces partners were initially restricted from accompanying Iraqi or Syrian partner forces on the battlefield, but they were allowed to support them with close air support. The communication chain, however, was too slow and led to some delayed direct support for the counter-ISIS forces on the battlefield. All this changed when a couple of bright minds saw the potential in Tactical Assault Kit and managed to put together tactical field kits, using the existing mapping tool as the technical medium to speed up coordination and target acquisition between counter-ISIS forces and NATO special operations forces elements. It thus became a success story, and the system is being actively used in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

For a comprehensive employment of Tactical Assault Kit within NATO special operations forces, every allied country will have to change the way they look at military communication. In order to best explain the concept of scalable connectivity in this context, one needs to consider how military missions are planned. The military mission consists of three fundamental parts: shoot, move, and communicate. Ahead of a mission, how to shoot and move are thoroughly analyzed in order to utilize the best tools in the toolbox. For instance, if a unit is planning an urban special reconnaissance mission, there are several tools to choose from. A civilian car can be chosen over a tactical vehicle to maintain a low profile when inserting the special reconnaissance team into the target area. To maximize the freedom of movement without being compromised, the team might select civilian clothes and easily concealed weapons. Using this approach, the likelihood of being detected is minimized, whereas the chance of success is maximized. In short, it comes down to the calculation of risk versus gain. Communications deserve as much attention and investment as the weapon components for the mission to be effective, but this is not currently the case.

Only a few tools are available as communication options, which restrict military elements to primarily utilize encrypted push-to-talk radios. The typical military communication plan, the so-called PACE (primary, alternate, contingency, emergency) plan, is mainly composed of different frequencies, predetermined satellite or VHF/HF communication channels, and regular cellphone use as emergency backup. However, current and near future peer adversaries all have electronic warfare capabilities. This means that the choice of NATO communication equipment and its integration into the planning phase of battle determines mission success or failure. Scalable connectivity can be an effective tool when the area of operations’ frequency spectrum is analyzed and appropriate communication tools are utilized. Despite the aforementioned benefits, NATO has been slow, if not resistant, to leveraging communication solutions that can connect its respective special operations forces. Furthermore, NATO members are prone to purchase equipment from large military communication corporations. This industrial base supply chain problem stems from corporations that offer rigid, comprehensive solutions that offer little to no flexibility by having proprietary software and hardware. It also leads to transmitting a large military fingerprint easily detectable by adversaries. To move past the problem of inflexible military communication equipment, NATO needs to rethink the concepts of what is secure and classified and how this will impact the risk to a mission and force.

NATO special operations forces have been slow to adopt innovative solutions such as Tactical Assault Kit, despite its attractive and innovative features. What explains this resistance? Resistance to innovation is at once puzzling, intellectually intriguing, and a commercially interesting phenomenon. In the 1940s, the German psychologist Kurt Lewin was the first to introduce a systemic understanding of the resistance phenomenon. The cause, according to Lewin, is not found in the mind of the individual employee, but in the dynamics of opposing forces, including the behavior of leadership. According to the political economist Josef Schumpeter, “Innovation is the creation of new combinations that represent a departure from established practices.” In other words, a technological tension between the need to innovate and the desire to maintain order and stability will always exist. Wendell Wallach nicely defines the problem as “the pacing gap” between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development. Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to govern using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms.

NATO as a whole suffers severely from the pacing gap, due to the fact that it consists of 29-member countries. If a new communication technology is proven highly successful by one country, the product still has to be vetted by each country’s security and intelligence services. A process like this takes time and consumes resources, forcing poorer nations to evaluate the importance of a new technology versus the old. This process exacerbates the pacing gap within NATO as standardization becomes a protracted process of having to generate consensus among the member states.

#### That emerging tech debate destroys NATO unity

Walsh, 13 -- President of the Emerging Science and Technology Policy Centre

[Eddie Walsh, Senior Fellow at the School of Foreign Service – Georgetown University, "Danger of Emerging Technologies Dividing NATO," Atlantic Council, 8-16-2013, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/danger-of-emerging-technologies-dividing-nato/, accessed 6-4-2022]

Converging technologies also pose fundamental human security challenges. As Francis Fukuyama once argued in Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, converging technologies could inequitably transform the world we live in and, in the process, undermine the very foundations that underpin liberal democracies. Whether or not such a future unfolds, it is clear that their application raises serious ethical and moral issues that are proving divisive for allies and enemies alike (eg: the debates over armed drones and cyber espionage). Even where common approaches can be achieved (eg: combatting designer drugs), converging technologies are growing “faster than our ability to legislate or regulate” them.

These developments are putting new stresses on the NATO alliance. According to a recent experts workshop, the NBRIC Revolution is threatening NATO unity. “As warfare is outsourced to only those who are ‘near peers’ in technology and societal views shift,” NATO will likely experience “decreasing political tolerance for alliance security efforts”. If NATO member states want to sustain “the traditional transatlantic compact [European political support in return for US military guarantees]”, they must change the way NATO approaches cooperative security around emerging technologies. And, they need to do it now.

**Taiwan war goes nuclear- most recent war games prove**

**Pettyjohn, 22** -- Center for a New American Security defense program director

[Stacie L., and Becca Wasser, fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security, "A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear," Foreign Affairs, 5-20-22, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear, accessed 5-26-22]

A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go **Nuclear**

**War-Gaming** Reveals How a U.S.-Chinese Conflict Might **Escalate**

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe.

A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could **very well go nuclear**.

Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict.

GEARING FOR BATTLE

China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation.

China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan.

Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could **escalate quickly**. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face **operational incentives** to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed **red lines** for both countries, and produced a **tit-for-tat** cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict.

For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii.

A NEW ERA

One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to **preemptively detonate a nuc**lear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning.

China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response.

The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives.

### Overview: Impact Calc

#### Link alone takes out solvency- unanimous consensus policy blocks adoption

Abshire, 9 -- Center for Strategic and International Studies co-founder

[David, former US Ambassador to NATO, "NATO’s Survival Depends on Afghanistan," The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2009, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ambrev/ambrev627/f\_0017761\_15212.pdf, accessed 6-19-22]

Third, the Alliance inefficiently operates under a laborious consensus decision making process that requires total unanimity. This policy remains, despite NATO’s massive expansion (from 16 to 28 members) since the end of the Cold War. Because of this, NATO lacks the ability to act decisively. While NATO can break out of this decision making process when it comes to a humanitarian mission or counter-piracy operations, NATO continues to follow this inefficient procedure when it comes to making decisions regarding the war in Afghanistan. Recently retired Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, General Bantz J. Craddock, has stated that because of this policy it took NATO over a year to adopt a coherent countemarcotics strategy. This policy tragically undermines NATO’s ability to fight a war.

#### Turkey alone is a spoiler

Crowley, 22 -- NY Times Washington Bureau diplomatic correspondent

[Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally," NY Times, 5-30-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally

When President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey threatened this month to block NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, Western officials were exasperated — but not shocked.

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan.

After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member.

Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy.

“These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.”

Mr. Erdogan’s stance is a reminder of a long-festering problem for NATO, which currently has 30 members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have given the alliance a new sense of mission, but NATO must still contend with an authoritarian leader willing to use his leverage to gain political points at home by blocking consensus — at least for a time.

It is a situation that plays to the advantage of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has grown friendlier with Mr. Erdogan in recent years. For the Russian leader, the rejection of Swedish and Finnish admission into NATO would be a significant victory.

The quandary would be simpler were it not for Turkey’s importance to the alliance. The country joined NATO in 1952 after aligning with the West against the Soviet Union; Turkey gives the alliance a crucial strategic position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, astride both the Middle East and the Black Sea. It hosts a major U.S. air base where American nuclear weapons are stored, and Mr. Erdogan has blocked Russian warships headed toward Ukraine.

But under Mr. Erdogan, Turkey has increasingly become a problem to be managed. As prime minister and then as president, he has tilted his country away from Europe while practicing an authoritarian and populist brand of Islamist politics, especially since a failed coup attempt in 2016.

He has purchased an advanced missile system from Russia that NATO officials call a threat to their integrated defense systems, and in 2019 he mounted a military incursion to battle Kurds in northern Syria who were aiding the fight against the Islamic State with U.S. support.

“In my four years there, it was quite often 27 against one,” said Ivo H. Daalder, a U.S. ambassador to NATO during the Obama administration, when the alliance had 28 members.

## UNIQUENESS

### UQ: Unity

#### We control issue-specific uniqueness- NATO is sufficiently united to impose big costs on Russia and thus deter Chinese aggression- that’s Jash.

#### NATO unity is high now- thumpers before the invasion are irrelevant

Livingston, 22 -- Texas Tribune Washington bureau chief

[Abby Livingston, "Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, 4-6-22, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/, accessed 6-4-2022]

That alliance is having a renaissance in Europe, as the United States and its allies are trying to prevent the Russian invasion from spilling into NATO countries. Most mainstream foreign policy experts credit NATO’s efficacy for containing the Russian aggression to Ukraine.

Republican U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul of Austin is the top House Republican on foreign affairs and voted to support NATO. On Wednesday, he sported a blue-and-gold Ukrainian ribbon on his suit jacket at the Capitol.

He told The Texas Tribune that NATO countries are “stepping up” in ways some countries had lagged before. A frequent conservative critique of NATO is that many European countries fall short of the expected standard that all member countries spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense.

“NATO is more unified than it’s ever been. Germany now is putting in 2% of their GDP. And they are sending weapons and they are training,” he said.

NATO bonds further frayed in recent years, as Trump regularly railed against the alliance. But his criticism did lead to several NATO countries deciding to increase their defense spending.

Everything changed six weeks ago when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, a country on the Eastern European frontier that long aspired to join the organization. Several NATO countries located near Ukraine, like Poland, are most impacted by the refugee exodus from Ukraine.

#### NATO unity is strong now- they’re focused on deterring Russia

Guyer, 22 -- Vox senior foreign policy writer

[Jonathan, "NATO was in crisis. Putin’s war made it even more powerful," Vox, 3-25-2022, https://www.vox.com/22994826/nato-resurgence-biden-trip-putin-ukraine, accessed 6-4-2022]

When President Joe Biden landed in Europe this week, it was a different continent than he had last visited in the fall of 2021.

After a month of intensive fighting in Ukraine, Russia has killed at least 1,000 civilians while an unknown number (but reportedly thousands) of Russian soldiers have died. By invading Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has catalyzed some major shifts. Germany, long averse to military spending, has decided to up its defense budget. European countries, skeptical of migrants, have welcomed Ukrainian refugees. And most of all, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been revived.

Long a lethargic dinosaur of an organization, NATO this week announced new battle groups would deploy to four countries on its eastern flank, and Biden announced that the alliance would respond to Russia should it use chemical weapons in Ukraine. It’s a remarkable shift for an alliance that French President Emmanuel Macron called brain dead just two and a half years ago. And it reveals a fundamental truth of the organization: It’s an alliance meant to counter a great power adversary, for good and bad.

Biden, who has long cheered the relationship between the United States and Europe, met 29 other heads of state and the secretary general of NATO for a closed-door meeting Thursday, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined by video. “Today’s establishment of four new battle groups in Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary is a strong signal that we will collectively defend and protect every inch of NATO territory,” Biden said.

NATO summits, it might be said, are not usually very substantive. The family photo of recognizable world leaders is often the most memorable moment from these largely symbolic affairs. But NATO, an alliance forged to push back against Soviet influence in Europe during the Cold War, is designed for crisis.

Plenty of new things, in addition to the troop deployment, came out of Thursday’s meetings and in advance of them. Biden announced $1 billion in new humanitarian aid to those affected by the new refugee crisis in Europe, and a week earlier, the US had announced $1 billion more in military and security aid to Ukraine. Together with European countries, the White House and State Department announced even more sanctions on Russian politicians, military leaders, and elites, and measures to stop sanctions-evaders. Biden also said he would support throwing Russia out of the G20 club of countries with major economies.

The trip isn’t just about NATO. Biden is meeting with leaders of the European Union and the G7 countries. He will also travel to Poland, which, bordering Ukraine, has received more than 2 million Ukrainian refugees as of this week. And Biden announced that the US will welcome 100,000 refugees from the ongoing war.

“NATO was first sort of given a new mission, or a new lease on life, by the events of 2014,” the last time Putin invaded Ukraine, said Samuel Charap, a Russia expert at the RAND Corporation. “There’s a unity of purpose now that there wasn’t before.”

How NATO is meeting the moment

The alliance of 30 countries in Europe and North America had been intended to contain the Soviet Union’s advances in the world. Yet as recently as three years ago, critics — including some world leaders — wondered if it wasn’t well suited for the geopolitics of the 21st century.

Some preeminent US foreign policy leaders argued in the 1990s that NATO wasn’t the right way for the US to engage Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, but then as now, NATO skeptics didn’t have much sway in Washington.

Enter US President Donald Trump. Preaching a so-called America-first foreign policy, Trump often bashed NATO; he wanted allies to spend more on their militaries, and reportedly for the US to withdraw from the alliance. That stance rankled members of the Washington security establishment, but he wasn’t the only one who emphasized the alliance’s shortcomings. “What we are currently experiencing is the brain death of NATO,” Macron said in 2019.

The comment came after Trump pulled US troops out of Syria to avoid clashing with NATO ally Turkey. He withdrew those forces, however, without consulting with other NATO allies, calling into question the dependability of the Trump White House — and by extension, of the United States. US power is one of the biggest guarantors of the alliance, and Trump had battered that image.

“You have partners together in the same part of the world, and you have no coordination whatsoever of strategic decision-making between the United States and its NATO allies. None,” added Macron. He later stood by that harsh assessment.

Those criticisms, and other concerns throughout the late 2010s, led even former diplomats and scholars who were staunch supporters of the transatlantic alliance to say that NATO was in crisis.

Derek Chollet and Amanda Sloat, two policy experts who are now senior Biden administration officials, wrote in Foreign Policy magazine in 2018 that NATO summits were “just not worth it” and simply too risky when Trump was in office, as he denigrated the alliance on the world stage.

Nicholas Burns, a Harvard professor who is now serving as Biden’s ambassador to China, co-wrote a paper three years ago that argued that Trump’s NATO bashing, increasingly undemocratic leaders under the NATO umbrella (among them Turkey and Hungary), and NATO’s failure to confront Putin “have hurtled the Alliance into its most worrisome crisis in memory.”

Now NATO is a key pillar of the Biden administration’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “Putin has reinvigorated NATO in a fundamental way,” said Ivo Daalder, who served as Obama’s ambassador to NATO and now directs the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. “What Biden has done is he has reminded Americans and our allies how important NATO is.”

To deter Russia, NATO has doubled the active forces under its direct command in eastern Europe; there are now about 40,000 on the continent, in addition to the 100,000 US troops stationed there. A NATO spokesperson tweeted a graphic showing that 130 aircraft and 140 naval vessels are “on high alert.”

As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at the top of the summit, “NATO is providing unprecedented support to Ukraine, helping them to defend themselves.” He mentioned the “unprecedented sanctions” on Russia and NATO’s increased military presence, especially in Romania.

NATO is stepping up to be the leader of European security. Should it?

Proponents — and there are many — of the Biden team’s response and NATO’s resurgence say this is exactly what the alliance should be doing.

NATO was the United States’ first transcontinental peacetime alliance, and maintaining it in peacetime is important, says John Manza, a former senior NATO official who is now a professor at the National Defense University. “It’s like a fire truck that’s sitting in the local fire station. You can complain and say, ‘Oh, it’s not doing anything, it’s just costing us money’ — until there’s a fire and you need it,” he told me.

NATO is learning from its last major test, in 2014, when Putin annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and later invaded the country’s eastern provinces. In response, NATO expanded its cohort of rapid response troops.

The alliance in 2018 developed a readiness plan with major land, sea, and air capabilities able to mobilize in 30 days. This month, NATO announced that it is significantly growing its forward presence to plan for potential contingencies. “Now we have enough combat power to really defend conventionally alliance territory against a near-peer competitor, like Russia,” Manza said.

The alliance, at its core, is about preventing interstate war on the European continent. “It’s absolutely what you could call NATO’s sweet spot,” said Bruce Jentleson, a Duke political scientist and fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington. “When you have sort of a superseding shared security threat, that’s when countries work together.”

That’s not to say NATO has it all figured out. “The real conundrum for NATO is the nuclear, biological, and chemical one,” said Evelyn Farkas, a senior Pentagon official for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia during the Obama administration. “How would they respond if there was a nuclear detonation or a nuclear weapon used by Russia? And same for chemical and biological.”

The emerging consensus among the Washington foreign policy establishment, both right and left, is that the Biden administration deserves praise for how it has handled this crisis and shepherded NATO quickly to respond to Russian aggression. NATO has been unified with providing Ukraine with weapons, sanctioning Russia, and beginning to address the new influx of refugees.

#### Momentum is driving NATO unity now

Erlanger, 22 -- NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe

[Steven Erlanger, "Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again," NY Times, 1-14-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/14/world/europe/nato-russia-ukraine-europe.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Fear of Russia Brings New Purpose and Unity to NATO, Once Again

After years of drift, Trumpian ridicule and failure in Afghanistan, Russian demands for a new Iron Curtain in Europe have created unity in the alliance, at least for now.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO was an alliance in search of a role. Some suggested that if NATO did not “go out of area,” beyond Europe, it would “go out of business.”

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 revived NATO’s central importance as a counterweight to Moscow. But the alliance still seemed on its way to obsolescence, hobbled by a lack of purpose and disunity.

Former President Donald J. Trump ridiculed it and threatened to abandon it. President Emmanuel Macron of France bemoaned its “brain death.” The European Union pressed for “strategic autonomy” from Washington.

But Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s extraordinary new demands and threats, following his military buildup on the borders of Ukraine, has brought NATO back to basics — containing Russian power and imperium.

Mr. Putin’s insistence that NATO stop enlargement and remove allied forces from member states bordering Russia would draw a new Iron Curtain across Europe, and that threat has concentrated minds. It may be just what a lagging alliance has needed.

“NATO relies on momentum, and a lot of the momentum is generated by a sense of threat and fear,” said Andrea Kendall-Taylor, a former senior intelligence officer dealing with Russia, now with the Center for a New American Security.

After last year’s fiasco of Afghanistan and the humiliation of France in the Australian submarine deal, she said, “We were all thinking that we have serious problems in the alliance, and we might need to rethink the foundation of this relationship.”

But in talks this week with the Russians, NATO leaders spoke with exceptional unity for a 30-member alliance whose commitment to collective defense was increasingly in question.

The talks allowed Mr. Putin to revisit Russian grievances over how the Cold War ended, in hopes of placing them back on the table for renegotiation 30 years later. His deputy foreign minister, Aleksandr V. Grushko, even warned the alliance off a “policy of containment” of Russia and insisted that “free choice does not exist in international relations” — suggesting that Ukraine would have to bow to Russian wishes.

But the more the discussion evoked the Cold War — with its firm dividing line through Europe, and its competing Russian and Western systems and spheres of influence — the more it reminded European and American allies of NATO’s purpose.

“Deterring Russia is in the DNA of NATO, because Russia is what can bring existential threats to European nations,” said Anna Wieslander, chair of Sweden’s Institute for Security and Development.

That threat now is more than territorial, she said. Russia is also trying to undermine NATO’s democratic cohesion. “Russia is targeting our elections, our social media, our parliaments and our citizens, and it is become more obvious now that Russia is not part of our value system,” Ms. Wieslander said.

As it drafts a new strategic concept to be ready this year, NATO is concentrating on “resilience” against new hybrid and cyberthreats, highlighting its defense of the democratic institutions of member states, not just their territory.

“NATO is its member states, and it’s what allies make of it,” said Sophia Besch, a defense analyst in Berlin for the Center for European Reform. “It’s not out of business because we didn’t let it, and we’ve changed its raison d’être to what are the major strategic concerns of the day.”

The old joke was that if NATO is the answer, what is the question? Ms. Besch responded: “We’ve changed the question over the years to make NATO the answer. And now we’re back at the old question again, where NATO is more comfortable.”

NATO is especially important now for those states bordering Russia, like the Baltic nations and Poland, a country which has had deepening strains with its European partners over the protection of core democratic principles, which Brussels has accused the government in Warsaw of eroding.

But the current crisis is a reminder, even in Poland, of the importance of the alliance as a whole, and not just the country’s bilateral relationship with the United States, said Piotr Buras, head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Ukraine has proved especially vulnerable to Russian threats perhaps precisely because it is not a NATO member.

“In Poland there was concern that NATO would lose its focus on Russian security threats, but now it’s obvious that this is the only framework that can protect us and provide long-term security,” Mr. Buras said.

There was also anxiety that President Biden, in trying to stabilize relations with Russia to pivot toward China, would bargain away forward-based NATO troops in Poland and the Baltics that were deployed after 2014.

“But there is no sign that the United States will give in on fundamental issues to NATO,” like its open-door policy and its right to deploy forces in any member state, Mr. Buras said, and Washington has been rigorous in briefing its allies about all of its discussions with Russia.

Still, he said, the current crisis “is a very clear consequence of the U.S. pivot to Asia and the realization of Russia that it might now take advantage of that reorientation of U.S. fundamental security interests,” he said. “And that issue will not go away soon.”

Russia will continue to press for a new security framework in Europe, and Europe without the United States is not prepared to play any significant role, he said, so “for Poland, NATO is the key and irreplaceable element.”

Even as Poland’s battle with the European Union over the rule of law still festers, it is not an overt issue in the military alliance of NATO. But it was very noticeable that as the crisis over Ukraine mounted, President Andrzej Duda of Poland chose to veto a law, criticized by Washington, which would have stripped majority ownership of an independent television station from an American company.

As the security situation in Central Europe has worsened with Russian aggression and threats, Poland “got what we finally wanted when we joined NATO, which is allied and American troop presence on our soil — to finally bring NATO deployments beyond Germany,” said Michal Baranowski, who heads the Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund.

That is precisely one of Russia’s current demands — that those deployments in Poland and the Baltic States be removed, a demand rejected by Mr. Biden and by NATO, to Poland’s relief.

Still, Mr. Baranowski said, the Russians have mobilized the largest military force in Europe since 1989, “and that’s scary.” The alliance, he said, “is closer to military confrontation, but at least we have not folded.”

But the crisis has also highlighted the continuing dependence of NATO on Washington. For Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, what is striking is how much “this is the old NATO, where the U.S. is the glue, linchpin and indispensable leader of the alliance,” bringing allies together, informing them and “putting on the table the strategy we will pursue.”

What is extraordinary, he said, is that more than 70 years after the alliance was founded, “there appears to be no independent European strategy or even a European point of view different from what Washington brought to the table.” NATO has divisions, of course, Mr. Daalder said. “But all the divisions are dissolved, at least for today.”

### UQ: Capabilities

#### Troop boost proves

Petrequin, 22 -- Associated Press reporter in Brussels

[Samuel Petrequin, "NATO to boost its forces, equipment on eastern flank," AP News, 6-16-2022, https://apnews.com/b2e087a113f0fe50249ccd6087cee435, accessed 6-19-2022]

NATO to boost its forces, equipment on eastern flank

NATO defense ministers on Thursday discussed ways to bolster forces and deterrence along the military alliance’s eastern borders to dissuade Russia from planning further aggression in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian invasion has led allies to rethink strategies and to agree that NATO forces should be present in greater numbers on that eastern flank. NATO says it has placed over 40,000 troops under its direct command, mainly on the eastern flank, and is looking at how it can further strengthen its presence, readiness, and capabilities.

“This will mean more NATO forward-deployed combat formations, to strengthen our battlegroups in the eastern part of the alliance, more air, sea and cyber defenses, as well as pre-positioned equipment and weapons stockpiles,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said after the meeting.

The meeting of defense ministers came ahead of a June 29-30 NATO summit in Madrid that will seek to set a roadmap for the alliance in coming years.

Germany has already announced its plans to strengthen its engagement in Lithuania, while France wants to increase its presence in Romania, where it plans to have deployed 1,000 troops with Leclerc tanks by the end of the year.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin declined to detail any changes in America’s positioning of forces across Europe but said the U.S. and its allies will take steps to rapidly deploy troops if needed. That includes positioning more equipment in the region and putting troops on higher levels of alert.

“All of our allies have learned from any shortcomings that we may have experienced in the past, and they’ll build to ensure that they have the right capabilities to provide flexible and responsible and combat-credible forces when the time comes,” he said.

Artis Pabriks, the Latvian defense minister, said the military alliance should position larger armed forces and material in Baltic countries.

“We want an improved planning. We want a headquarters structure. We want pre-positioning of different types of equipment, so if a crisis would come we should not wait,” he said.

Stoltenberg said the question of pre-positioned equipment is a crucial one, because moving armored vehicles, supplies and ammunition takes a lot of time.

“Then of course it’s much easier and faster to reinforce when needed,” he said.

Stoltenberg said ministers made “significant progress” in their discussions on a new force model that would involve more forces at higher readiness and others assigned to the defense of specific allies.

Discussions in Brussels also focused on the need for more defense spending, Stoltenberg said, with the bids from Sweden and Finland to join the alliance also on the table.

Stoltenberg saluted the United States’ decision to send an additional $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine and said NATO allies are “prepared to continue to provide substantial, unprecedented support” to the country.

The latest package, the U.S. said, includes anti-ship missile launchers, howitzers and more rounds for the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems that U.S. forces are training Ukrainian troops on. All are key weapons systems that Ukrainian leaders have urgently requested as they battle to stall Russia’s march to conquer the eastern Donbas region.

Austin praised the “historic decision” by Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, expressing his hopes that discussions will continue to progress favorably.

### UQ: Focus

#### NATO has a laser-like focus on Ukraine

Mizokami, 22 -- Popular Mechanics defense and security issues correspondent

[Kyle, "Every Single Weapon Europe Is Sending to Ukraine (So Far)," Popular Mechanics, 3-2-22, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a39281936/weapons-europe-is-sending-to-ukraine/, accessed 6-4-22]

Ukraine’s western backers are sending more than 1,000 Stingers in all. The missiles have so far not seen much use, as Russia’s Air Force is flying fewer missions at higher altitudes than originally anticipated. Analysts believe, however, that as Russia exhausts its inventory of precision-guided weapons, it will be forced to drop unguided bombs from lower altitudes, bringing them within Stinger’s engagement envelope. The Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania all sent an unknown number of Stinger missiles before the war.

Field Artillery

NATO and the European Union nations are contributing relatively few artillery pieces, concentrating with laser-like focus on providing anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to blunt Russia’s core strengths. Artillery is also heavier and can be quickly neutralized if it does not regularly relocate.

### AT UQ Outweighs

#### NATO is unified- but can’t take it for granted- diplomacy is key

Wormuth, 22 -- US Secretary of the Army

[Christine, "NATO allies must not take their unity on Ukraine for granted, says Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth," Atlantic Council, 6-2-22, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/transcripts/nato-allies-must-not-take-their-unity-on-ukraine-for-granted-says-secretary-of-the-army-christine-wormuth/, accessed 6-4-22]

And so how do you see the US sustaining this level of support for Ukraine in a way that could actually make a difference in embattled regions like the Donbas, which is suffering significantly right now?

CHRISTINE WORMUTH: I think—you know, I think the administration has done, frankly, an admirable job, you know, helping the alliance come together and have the very, very strong unified position that we’ve had against the Russian invasion, and I think we’ll continue to see that unity, frankly. It will take work. I know from my own experience, you know, back in 2014 and 2015 it takes a lot of active diplomacy to be able to sustain that alliance unity. But I think, you know, all of the NATO countries see what is at stake, frankly, in what’s happening, and that alone, I think, is an incentive for us to maintain unity. I think, you know, in a practical way, we are looking—you know, certainly in the Department of Defense and in the Army—at how—you know, what do we need to be doing to allow us to continue to sustain the kind of lethal assistance that we’re providing to the Ukrainians? And that’s why we’ve signed contracts to replenish our Stingers and replenish our Javelins. You know, we have really leaned into trying to provide, you know, everything that the policymakers deem essential to get to the Ukrainians, and, you know, we have taken some risk to our own readiness, not an unacceptable level of risk at all. But I think we will continue to do that, and I think, you know, again, we can’t take that unity for granted, but I think the NATO countries know what’s at stake.

### AT Thumpers

#### NATO unity is high now- thumpers before the invasion are irrelevant

Livingston, 22 -- Texas Tribune Washington bureau chief

[Abby Livingston, "Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, 4-6-22, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/, accessed 6-4-2022]

That alliance is having a renaissance in Europe, as the United States and its allies are trying to prevent the Russian invasion from spilling into NATO countries. Most mainstream foreign policy experts credit NATO’s efficacy for containing the Russian aggression to Ukraine.

Republican U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul of Austin is the top House Republican on foreign affairs and voted to support NATO. On Wednesday, he sported a blue-and-gold Ukrainian ribbon on his suit jacket at the Capitol.

He told The Texas Tribune that NATO countries are “stepping up” in ways some countries had lagged before. A frequent conservative critique of NATO is that many European countries fall short of the expected standard that all member countries spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense.

“NATO is more unified than it’s ever been. Germany now is putting in 2% of their GDP. And they are sending weapons and they are training,” he said.

NATO bonds further frayed in recent years, as Trump regularly railed against the alliance. But his criticism did lead to several NATO countries deciding to increase their defense spending.

Everything changed six weeks ago when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, a country on the Eastern European frontier that long aspired to join the organization. Several NATO countries located near Ukraine, like Poland, are most impacted by the refugee exodus from Ukraine.

#### NATO is taking a go-slow approach on emerging tech- thumpers are priced-in- only cautious moves now- that’s key to political unity

Soare, 21 -- Research Fellow for Defence and Military Analysis

[Simona, "Algorithmic power, NATO and artificial intelligence," IISS, 11-19-21, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/11/algorithmic-power-nato-and-artificial-intelligence, accessed 6-4-2022]

NATO has formally approved its first Artificial Intelligence (AI) strategy as it seeks a leading position in the adoption of AI for defence, but it may face some critical hurdles ahead in implementing the strategy, according to Simona Soare.

NATO defence ministers have formally adopted the Alliance’s first artificial intelligence (AI) strategy. The document lays out six ‘baseline’ principles for ‘responsible’ military use of AI – lawfulness, responsibility and accountability, explainability and traceability, reliability, governability, and bias mitigation. It also provides an insight into key implementation challenges.

The strategy is meant to provide a ‘common policy basis’ to support the adoption of AI systems in order to achieve the Alliance’s three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The strategy is also designed to challenge established Alliance processes for procurement, technology development and wider engagement with the private sector and academia.

Only a summary of the strategy has been made public. However, it reveals four critical obstacles to implementation that NATO will face: reconciling the objectives of member nations; securing sufficient political and financial support; bridging any disconnect between the Alliance’s policy and operational units; and managing the transnational bureaucracy that will implement the strategy.

Hard questions

As well as being a consensus-building policy document, the strategy attempts to position NATO as the leader of AI adoption in defence. It reiterates the allies’ commitment to transatlantic cooperation on the development and use of AI in security and defence, an important element of which is ensuring inter-operability and standardisation.

There are still hard questions, however, about how NATO will coordinate different national approaches to managing the development and application of AI in defence, combined with restrictions on technology use, access, sharing and transfer. For countries like the United States, it is a priority that allies agree practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems and the necessary data-sharing, a challenge that should not be underestimated. Some allies, meanwhile, are not satisfied with the granularity of the six principles of responsible use, while others consider that overemphasising the normative approach risks ceding technological advantage to peer competitors.

Similar tensions are playing out in the European Union. The EU’s proposal for an AI act is more restrictive for high-risk, high-impact applications of AI, though its impact on defence will be indirect, as it do does not apply to the military domain. In the defence realm, the European Defence Agency’s Artificial Intelligence Action Plan for Defence shares more similarities with the NATO strategy. While the plan is not public, it reportedly includes a list of use cases for military applications of AI which member states may consider for collaborative development and principles of responsible development and use.

Another question that remains to be answered is the extent of NATO’s ambition to adopt AI. The strategy is meant to be implemented in a phased approach, partly to build political support for AI military projects. Initial ambitions seem modest, reportedly focusing on mission planning and support; smart maintenance and logistics for NATO capabilities; data fusion and analysis; cyber defence; and optimisation of back-office processes. As political acceptance grows and following periodic reviews of the strategy’s implementation, the goal is to also include more complex operational applications.

#### Thumpers are priced in as long as Biden avoids unilateral actions

Lesser, 21 -- vice president at The German Marshall Fund of the United States

[Ian, "Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden," GMFUS, xx-xx-xxxx, https://www.gmfus.org/news/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden, accessed 6-4-2022]

After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration.

The anticipated shift is likely to be most profound from the perspective of the EU and its institutions. Among member states, there was always a spectrum of views about Donald Trump. The outgoing administration’s approach enjoyed a degree of support in right-wing and nationalist circles, including several governments in Central and Eastern Europe. For some, this was a matter of ideology. For others it was a cooler geopolitical calculus. In general, however, the Trump administration was derided for its brash unilateral style as much as its policy choices, most of which were at odds with EU preferences. The list of sharp differences ranged from climate policy to trade, from Iran to the World Health Organization.

Above all, Trump and his key advisors were seen as dismissive of, or even opposed to, the idea of the EU itself. For them, international politics seemed to be about nation states, often individual leaders—some seen positively, most seen negatively. The traditional U.S. attachment to the “European project” had become the preserve of a foreign policy elite with little influence on Trump and his circle. A Biden administration should spell a return to the traditional balance in transatlantic relations, with the EU itself taken seriously again alongside relations with France, Germany, and others.

On substance, there is a realization that it may not all be smooth sailing across the Atlantic. Trade and digital policy are widely assumed to be the most challenging areas. Indeed, there is some concern that Biden may find it difficult to move away from the protectionist stance that has taken hold in recent years, against the backdrop of similar pressures in Europe and elsewhere. On other fronts, the outlook is for closer consultation and convergence. EU leaders will welcome a U.S. return to the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization. Biden has signaled a desire to bring the United States back into the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. A Biden administration is assumed to be more interested in and willing to assist with a host of problems on Europe’s periphery, from Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean.

In some respects, NATO was one of the areas least affected by Trump’s approach to the world. The U.S. military presence in Europe has grown modestly but steadily; a trend that began under President Barack Obama. U.S. complaints about defense burden-sharing were nothing new, even if the style was more abrasive. But from the start, Trump spread anxiety about the solidity of the U.S. commitment to European defense. It never quite came to a disavowal of Article V, and Trump would have faced a very tough bipartisan battle if he ever wished to leave NATO as he hinted on more than one occasion. By contrast, it is assumed that a Biden administration would put NATO back at the core of U.S. strategy. In policy terms, the emphasis on increased European defense spending will surely continue. There will be a tougher and more predictable line on Russia, coupled with an interest in new arms-control arrangements. Biden is a well-known figure in NATO circles. For the alliance, a Biden administration will be a return to the known world and an energizing element for the institution.

### AT Finland/Sweden

#### The Madrid Summit will pressure Turkey- they’ll cave soon

Engelbrekt, 22 -- Swedish Defense University professor and military expert

[interview with Reid Standish, "Interview: What's Next For Finland, Sweden's NATO Bids?," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 6-3-2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/sweden-finland-nato-bids-interview/31880579.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

RFE/RL: So do you think NATO is going to be able to declare that Sweden and Finland are on track to become members at the summit, even if they can’t fully accept them then?

Engelbrekt: As far as we understand, that may be a bit too far in terms of the formal process. But I think there will be some expression of support at the summit. We've seen it already from the U.S. side, and I think there will be more countries also coming out in [support of their applications in] Madrid.

Perhaps there'll be separate press briefings with basically all European Union countries expressing support, which in turn will put additional pressure on Turkey to back down. So that's what I envisage as the most likely scenario, but I would be surprised if they can resolve this before the summit.

RFE/RL: To summarize, we shouldn’t assume that this is a done deal?

Engelbrekt: Done deal is probably putting it a bit too strongly, but I'd expect that this gets resolved later this year.

#### Turkey will cave- this is short-term domestic politics

Crowley, 22 -- NY Times Washington Bureau diplomatic correspondent

[Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally," NY Times, 5-30-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Once again, the question is what will mollify Mr. Erdogan and ensure his support for admitting Sweden and Finland.

President Biden underscored U.S. support for the move when he hosted the two nations’ leaders at the White House this month and praised a larger NATO as a check against Russian power. “Biden took an extremely exposed, high-visibility position by inviting them to Washington,” said James F. Jeffrey, a U.S. ambassador to Turkey during the Obama administration.

Most analysts believe that Mr. Erdogan will not ultimately block the accession of Sweden and Finland, but that he wants to highlight Turkey’s own security concerns and make domestic political gains before elections in his country next year.

Mr. Erdogan is mainly concerned with Sweden’s longtime support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or P.K.K., which seeks an independent Kurdish state on territory partly within Turkey’s borders.

The P.K.K., which has attacked nonmilitary targets and killed civilians in Turkey, is outlawed in that country and is designated by both the United States and the European Union as a terrorist organization, although some governments, including Sweden, view it more sympathetically as a Kurdish nationalist movement.

The United States has also backed its affiliated fighters in Syria, the Y.P.G., or People’s Protection Units, who helped to battle the Islamic State and whom Mr. Erdogan attacked in his 2019 incursion into the country.

The Turkish president wants the Y.P.G. to be designated as a terrorist group as well.

Mr. Erdogan accuses both Finland and Sweden of harboring followers of Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish cleric living in U.S. exile, whom he blames for the 2016 coup. Turkey is requesting the extradition of roughly 35 people it says are involved with Kurdish separatists or Mr. Gulen.

Mr. Erdogan also objects to Swedish and Finnish arms embargoes against his country, which were imposed after the 2019 incursion into Syria. Sweden is already discussing lifting the embargo given current events in Ukraine.

Some analysts say that Mr. Erdogan’s government views the P.K.K. much the way Washington saw Al Qaeda 20 years ago, and that the West cannot dismiss the concerns if it hopes to do business with Turkey.

Biden administration officials downplay the standoff and expect Mr. Erdogan to reach a compromise with Finland and Sweden. Turkish officials met in Ankara with Finnish and Swedish counterparts for several hours last week.

Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, said in an interview that “this appears to be an issue that they have with Sweden and Finland, so we’ll leave it in their hands.” She added that the United States would provide assistance if needed.

Appearing with Finland’s foreign minister in Washington on Friday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said he was “confident that we will work through this process swiftly, and that things will move forward with both countries.”

Emre Peker, a London-based director for Europe at the Eurasia Group, a private consulting firm, said that he did not believe that Mr. Erdogan was seeking concessions from Washington. He expressed confidence that Turkey could work out an agreement with Sweden and Finland with the mediation of the NATO secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg.

#### No impact- Finland and Sweden aren’t key

Caldwell, 22 -- Stand Together foreign policy vice president

[Dan Caldwell, and Russ Vought, "Finland and Sweden joining NATO won't make U.S. safer," Fox News, 6-13-2022, https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/finland-sweden-joining-nato-us-safer, accessed 6-19-2022]

One frequently cited justification for admitting Finland and Sweden to NATO is that they have capable militaries that would enhance NATO. However, the reality is that both countries have relatively small professional militaries of around 20,000 troops each that rely on large reserve forces in a time of war and which lack long-range force projection capabilities. Sweden is already requesting a larger U.S. naval presence in the Baltic Sea, calling into question the ability of their military to secure their own backyard.

Additionally, neither country currently meets the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal that was agreed to by NATO members. Just as in other parts of Europe, a security guarantee provided by the United States could encourage free-riding and disincentivize increased investment in defense capabilities in favor of more spending on politically popular social programs.

#### It’ll get done soon

Osborn, 22 -- National Interest defense editor

[Kris Osborn, "Pentagon Says Finland and Sweden ‘Close’ to Joining NATO," National Interest, 6-18-2022, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/pentagon-says-finland-and-sweden-%E2%80%98close%E2%80%99-joining-nato-203099, accessed 6-19-2022]

Pentagon Says Finland and Sweden ‘Close’ to Joining NATO

Having both Sweden and Finland join NATO members would immeasurably strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture and prospects for victory in the event of a major war with Russia.

According to U.S. defense secretary Lloyd Austin, both Finland and Sweden are “close” to joining NATO, a development which would further reshape the alliance’s security posture in Europe.

“Now, NATO is also close to welcoming two new members to the Alliance, and Finland and Sweden have made the historic decisions to apply for membership, and that reflects the appeal of NATO's core values,” Austin said following a meeting with NATO secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels, Belgium.

### AT Long Haul

#### Cuts two ways- being bogged down in Ukraine also weakens Russia.

#### NATO’s ready for years

Reuters, 22 [Reuters, "NATO says it's ready to back Kyiv for years in war against Russia," 4-28-2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-says-ready-support-kyiv-war-against-russia-that-could-last-years-2022-04-28/, accessed 6-19-2022]

NATO says it's ready to back Kyiv for years in war against Russia

NATO is ready to maintain its support for Ukraine in the war against Russia for years, including help for Kyiv to shift from Soviet-era weapons to modern Western arms and systems, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on Thursday.

He spoke after the Kremlin warned that Western arms supplies to Ukraine, including heavy weapons, posed a threat to the security of the European continent "and provoke instability". read more

"We need to be prepared for the long term," Stoltenberg told a youth summit in Brussels. "There is absolutely the possibility that this war will drag on and last for months and years."

The NATO chief said the West would continue to put maximum pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the invasion of Ukraine, which Moscow calls a "special military operation", through sanctions and economic as well as military aid to Kyiv.

"NATO allies are preparing to provide support over a long period of time and also help Ukraine to transit, move from old Soviet-era equipment to more modern NATO-standard weapons and systems that will also require more training," Stoltenberg said.

Most of the heavy weapons NATO countries have sent to Ukraine so far are Soviet-built arms still in the inventories of east European NATO member states, but the United States and some other allies have started to supply Kyiv with Western howitzers.

Germany on Tuesday announced the shipment of Gepard tanks equipped with anti-aircraft guns to Ukraine, the first time Berlin has approved heavy weapons deliveries for Kyiv. read more

Ukraine's pleas for heavy weapons have intensified since Moscow shifted its offensive to the Donbas, an eastern region with largely flat, open terrain seen as better suited for tank battles than the areas in the north around the capital Kyiv where much of the earlier fighting took place.

#### Defense spending and force adjustments prove

Grady, 22 -- USNI News

[John, "U.S., NATO in for a 'Long Haul' Conflict with Russia, Says Polish PM," USNI News, 5-17-2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/05/17/u-s-nato-in-for-a-long-haul-conflict-with-russia-says-polish-pm, accessed 6-19-2022]

U.S., NATO in for a ‘Long Haul’ Conflict with Russia, Says Polish PM

NATO and the West must be “in the fight for the long haul” economically, diplomatically and militarily in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, Poland’s prime minister said Tuesday.

Although drawing the line at direct military confrontation, Mateusz Morawiecki, in prepared remarks delivered by a Polish chancellery official at the Atlantic Council, said, “it’s up to us to win the battle” of protecting Ukrainian sovereignty and blunting possible Kremlin moves against alliance members.

“Ukraine is fighting this war not only for its security but ours.” He said the Feb. 24 invasion “turns out to be a wake-up call” to all of Europe about President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions in eastern and central Europe.

In response to the invasion, the prime minister added, “we, the Europeans, have to step up our defense spending.”

Poland already meets the NATO threshold of spending 2 percent of its gross domestic product on security. In light of the war in Ukraine, Warsaw intends to raise that percentage in coming years.

Morawiecki praised the United States for its “stepped-up presence” on NATO’s eastern flank to signal to Russia that the alliance is serious about defense.

Mark Brzezinski, American ambassador to Poland, said that in Warsaw, there are now 12,600 American soldiers on Polish bases. Either arriving with them or coming soon are M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters.

“We are being tested, and Poland is under threat,” he said when explaining the reasoning behind the U.S. troop levels there.

Former ambassador to Poland, Daniel Fried, said, “we don’t know who will win” in Ukraine, but the Ukrainians “have a reasonable chance of success.” He said the West has to keep the pressure on Moscow. “We can’t screw this up.”

Brzezinski added that the movement of so many U.S. forces and so much equipment eastward from the U.S. and other bases in Europe “allow[s] NATO to stand firm.” He said the American build-up and similar moves by the United Kingdom further underscore Washington’s and London’s commitment to the alliance.

#### NATO is prepped for the long haul

La Presna, 22 ["Prep for 'long haul' in Ukraine 'war of attrition:' NATO chief," 6-12-2022, https://www.laprensalatina.com/prep-for-long-haul-in-ukraine-war-of-attrition-nato-chief/, accessed 6-19-2022]

Prep for ‘long haul’ in Ukraine ‘war of attrition:’ NATO chief

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg Thursday said the Ukraine conflict had become “a war of attrition,” and the world must prepare for “the long haul” before its end at a negotiating table.

Speaking at the White House after meeting with US President Joe Biden, Stoltenberg said it was up to Ukraine alone to decide what to negotiate over when that time came, and NATO’s obligation was to help Kyiv defend its sovereignty.

He said the Ukrainians were “paying a high price for defending their own country,” but Russia was “taking high casualties.”

“We just have to be prepared for the long haul. What we see is that this war has now become a war of attrition,” said the head of the US-led transatlantic military alliance.

Stoltenberg also met Vice President Harris and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan at the White House ahead of the June 29-30 NATO summit in Madrid.

The NATO chief said the planned summit in the Spanish capital “takes place at a pivotal time for our security” in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“We will make sure that NATO continues to adapt to a more competitive world, with strategic competition and where we see the impact on our security from authoritarian powers like Russia and China,” he said.

Stoltenberg recalled that Russian President Vladimir Putin attacked Ukraine because he “wanted less NATO.

“But he is getting more NATO, with more NATO presence in the eastern part of the alliance and also with more members,” he said.

He referred to Finland and Sweden applying for membership to the military bloc, saying “they are historic decisions” that will “strengthen NATO and strengthen our transatlantic bond.”

## LINK

### L: Emerging Tech

#### NATO can’t agree on more than the basics when it comes to emerging tech- pushing the issue farther exposes divergences that collapse NATO’s drive

Heikkilä, 21 – Politico Europe correspondent

[Melissa Heikkilä, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," Politico, 3-29-21, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/, accessed 6-4-2022]

NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.

Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive.

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.

The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.

“We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO.

The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight.

David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus.

"I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said.

Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.

For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications.

The pitch

NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said.

The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said.

The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems.

“If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said.

“We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued.

Mission impossible?

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context.

The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies.

“It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said:

That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.

The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently.

There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control.

Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology.

These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban.

Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”

Staying relevant

These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said.

She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body.

That could have consequences for human rights, too.

“NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign.

“Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said.

Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics.

#### The plan sets off a slow, time-consuming consensus-building process

Cook, 22 -- directs the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group

[Cynthia R. Cook, formerly spent 25 years at the RAND Corporation; and Anna Dowd, senior international security and defense policy expert, an adjunct at the RAND Corporation, and co-founder of the Digital Innovation Engine, "How to Get NATO Forces the Technology They Need," War on the Rocks, 5-13-2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-to-get-nato-forces-the-technology-they-need/, accessed 6-4-2022]

For those of us who study the NATO acquisition process, it is almost impossible to imagine the alliance identifying a requirement and adopting a solution so quickly, no matter how urgent the circumstances. Among the many challenges would be the alliance’s elaborate, consensus-based governing structure, as well as the divergent interests and funding mechanisms among the 30 member states. This is why, in 2016, the International Board of Auditors concluded that NATO struggles to provide commanders with required capabilities on time and estimated that common-funded capabilities required an average of 16 years from development to delivery.

The complexity of modern weapons systems and the challenges of interoperability mean that any active engagement will lead to the identification of new technical requirements for NATO. The alliance needs the processes and structures in place to rapidly identify these requirements and procure solutions. This includes giving commanders the authority to make decisions without the lengthy consensus-building approach that may be reasonable, if slow, in peacetime but is not effective during war.

First Steps

NATO has previously sought to improve the governance, speed, and efficiency of its capability-delivery process. For example, in 2018 NATO adopted a new governance model for common-funded capabilities. It has undertaken efforts to enhance collaboration between strategic commands (Allied Command Operations in Mons, Belgium and Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA), called for the exploration of alternative acquisition strategies to support technology development, and created the Office of the Chief Information Officer to accelerate the delivery of computer and information systems. Furthermore, in October 2021 NATO launched the first $1.1 billion Innovation Fund, and last month announced the creation of the first ever Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic to harness cutting-edge technologies as part of the NATO 2030 agenda.

These are valuable steps, but they do not address the fundamental challenge of rapidly acquiring common capabilities. There are still many residual processes where consensus-based control is inherently prioritized over speed, flexibility, innovation, and the deployment of prototypes at the end of their development phases.

NATO leaders recognize the ongoing challenge. In a recent speech to the North Atlantic Council, the supreme allied commander transformation, Gen. Philippe Lavigne, stressed that one of his key priorities is to ensure the timely delivery of new and critical capabilities, adding that “we need to change the rules and make them work for us, not against us.” But NATO leaders cannot fix this alone — the alliance’s 30 member nations are the ones that will have to agree on the solution. Exploring alternatives and getting the allies to agree on a solution will be difficult. It can happen on a NATO-wide basis, or some subset of member nations can take on the challenge and lead the effort, which may then be adopted by others.

#### Emerging tech is divisive- especially because the EU wants to lead

Simón, 22 -- Senior Analyst and Director of the Elcano Royal Institute’s Brussels Office

[Luis, Research Professor of International Relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and Félix Arteaga, Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and a Lecturer at the Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, "NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept," Real Instituto Elcano, 1-17-22, https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/, accessed 6-4-2022]

Emerging and disruptive technologies

Industrial cooperation and technological innovation is a subject that has been gaining ground in NATO circles in recent years, particularly with regard to emerging and disruptive technologies. It is true that the economic interests of the companies based in the member countries differ, and that so far NATO has not managed to consolidate the channels of existing collaboration. Furthermore, the EU’s aspiration to attain strategic autonomy, and the particular attention it pays to the technological-industrial aspect of defence, heralded another episode of transatlantic discord, now on the way to being healed thanks to the concept of so-called ‘open’ strategic autonomy, which will enable non-EU-member allies to take part in its industrial and technological initiatives.

Added to the discrepancies between allies there is now the need to address the challenge posed by emerging technologies and those threatening to disrupt the traditional military superiority of the Alliance. In this context, the NATO 2030 report emphasises the importance of the Alliance maintaining its technological lead over possible rivals and warns of the progress made by China in terms of innovation. The adoption of NATO’s first Artificial Intelligence strategy in 2021, the setting up of the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the launch of the NATO Innovation Fund in October 2021[13] are tangible progress in the chapter of technological innovation and is destined to play a prominent role in the Madrid summit and Strategic Concept.

#### Only existential threats unite NATO- the plan causes divisions over forum-shopping

Aaronson, 11 -- University of Surrey Department of Politics research fellow and senior adviser to NATO

[Michael, Sverre Diessen, Yves De Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, and Michael Miklaucic, "NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat," Prism 2, No. 4, 2011, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism\_2-4/Prism\_111-124\_Aaronson-Diessen.pdf, accessed 6-4-22]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most successful collective security arrangement among states in the 20th century. Having deterred and outlasted its primary adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO now faces the challenge of redefining its roles and purposes in the 21st century. Like all pluralist organizations, the Alliance must reflect the common interests of its 28 members, and defining common interests that motivate all members to sacrifice for the good of the whole has been difficult. In the absence of a direct common military threat, disparate interests, commitments, and visions of the transatlantic future have fragmented Alliance coherence.

The Strategic Concept adopted by heads of state and government in Lisbon in November 2010 reconfirms the NATO commitment to “deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.”1 It offers itself as the strategic map for NATO in the 21\* century and touches on extremism, terrorism, and such transnational illegal activities as trafficking in arms, narcotics, and people, as well as cyber attacks and other technological and environmental threats. The Strategic Concept, however, does not refer to hybrid threats or provide insight into the magnitude, likelihood, nature, or nuances of the “emerging security challenges.” Moreover, it does not address the possibility of having to face some or many of these challenges simultaneously, or the threat posed by the convergence of these many separate elements, which when braided together constitute a threat of a different nature.

The new threat confronting the diverse nations of the Alliance is insidious and not easily defined or identified. It flourishes in the seams between states, and in the soft areas of bad or weak governance. The new threat consists of distinct but tangled elements—hence the rubric hybrid threat. Hybrid threats are much more than the amalgamation of existing security challenges. This is due in part to the interrelatedness of their constituent elements, the complicated and interdependent nature of the activities required to counter them, the multiplicity of key stakeholders with vested interests, and the dynamic international security environment in which traditional military solutions may not be best (or even a key component) but may nevertheless be necessary. As NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has recently stated, “The paradox ... is that the global order enjoys more stakeholders than ever before, and yet it has very few guarantors.”2

The task of articulating, elaborating, and developing these concepts has been assigned to NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT). In the words of one NATO/ACT official, the task is to “paint the face on the faceless enemy"5 and to develop the hybrid threat concept, as well as examine viable and effective strategies to meet hybrid threats. A recent experiment raised important issues concerning how NATO does business. One of the issues raised was how NATO reaches out to important civilian players who it may have to rely on or even support in its current and future endeavors. Another topic was how the Alliance engages with industry, particularly with the cyber and energy sectors as two key areas identified in the Strategic Concept. Yet another issue is how NATO deals with non-military threats that are nevertheless security dangers to the Alliance but do not lend themselves easily to the traditional Article 5 analysis. Lastly, the experiment asked whether NATO bureaucracy and its processes have kept pace with a rapidly changing world; or whether the Alliance is positioned to respond effectively to the frightening pace of emerging security threats.

NATO in the 21st Century

As NATO positions itself to meet the diverse and complex security challenges of the 21“ century, it must carefully take stock of the needs of all its members. In examining emerging threats, the following points are salient:

❖ We need to be as secure against emerging threats as we were against the conventional threats of the past.

❖ NATO was appropriate for security against past (that is, conventional) threats.

❖ Its effectiveness against emerging threats should not be taken for granted and must he demonstrated.

❖ We must understand the nature of the new threats.

❖ We must discover how these threats can be effectively countered.

❖ We must determine what role, if any, NATO can play in countering these threats.

NATO operates by consensus; it has only been the presence of an existential clearly identifiable threat (the Soviet Union) that allowed the Alliance to operate effectively over the years. Because hybrid threats are not clearly identifiable and their existential nature is not the subject of consensus, there is never an imperative to address the challenge they pose. One way of framing the issue, therefore, is to say that we must demonstrate the existential nature of the current threat or threats to provoke a discussion and decision about how NATO wishes to respond. Without this, the discussion will continue to fall prey to conflicting visions for NATO within the Alliance.

NATO nations are all members of the United Nations (UN), and most belong to the European Union (EU). So for any NATO member, the starting point in the discussion will not necessarily be who NATO needs to work with to counter emerging or hybrid threats, but rather to what extent states want to work through NATO as opposed to individually, or through the UN, the EU, or other alliances. NATO action is complicated by the blurred distinction between legality and legitimacy in an Alliance intervention where there is no clear and unambiguous Article 5 justification.

The 1999 Kosovo intervention, for example, was widely perceived as morally justified and therefore legitimate when compared to nonintervention. Legality, on the other hand, will by definition depend on a Security Council resolution sanctioning military intervention by the international community. Despite the possibility of the Security Council acting in what may be the political interest of its member nations without being strictly moral by universal standards, it is generally accepted that Security Council-sanctioned action is legitimate by definition. In other words, all legal actions are legitimate, whereas the opposite is not necessarily true. Or, to put it another way, legality is a subset of legitimacy, and legitimacy is not for NATO alone to determine. Allied leadership acknowledges this: “The UN Security Council must remain the overall source of legitimacy for international peace and stability.’’4

Since it is widely held that UN sanction is a prerequisite for any kind of legitimate civil-military intervention, NATO’s level of ambition will be effectively limited by what the least willing member country can agree to. This, in turn, is decided by the degree of necessity from the point of view of the country least threatened, or by the member for whom intervention policies are most difficult for domestic political reasons. This dynamic has been clearly brought out by the current NATO intervention in the Libyan conflict. This may raise doubt about the ability of NATO to deal with hybrid threats, other than as a forum for the creation of coalitions of the (most) willing—provided there is also the necessary legitimacy.

#### Moving fast on tech causes political backlash and CMR disputes

Havránek, 21 -- deputy minister of defense of the Czech Republic

[Jan Havránek, former policy adviser at the Policy Planning Unit of the office of the NATO secretary general in Brussels, and Daniel P. Bagge, Cyber Attaché of the Czech Republic to the US with the National Cyber and Information Security Agency between 2018-2021, "Technology Adoption: Are we too late to the party?," Small Wars Journal, 7-18-2021, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/technology-adoption-are-we-too-late-party, accessed 6-4-2022]

Raising awareness among political leaders about the new technologies’ impact on NATO may not be as simple as it seems. Currently, there is a growing gap in perception of the new technology’s importance between the political and military level. Military authorities of the Alliance have, for a long time, been highlighting the need for innovation and adoption of new technologies.[15] Trials of innovative technological solutions and new capabilities have been part of NATO’s military training and exercises. For example, NATO now regularly tests unmanned systems in the maritime area[16] and there is work being done in the area of Electronic Spectrum warfare. Furthermore, adoption of new technologies in new capabilities development has been encouraged through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). In 2018, the Allied Command Transformation developed Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Roadmap, which received political endorsement at the meeting of defence ministers in June 2019.

On the political front, the effort has been slower. Until recently, the Allies themselves have maintained a rather declaratory approach to technology and innovation. Later, in 2020, the Secretary General appointed an innovation advisory group to provide counsel on NATO’s next steps in the tech area. A full political strategy on the emerging and disruptive technologies was finally adopted at the Brussels Summit in June 2021: “[T]his strategy seeks to preserve our interoperability; safeguard our sensitive technologies; and actively address the threats and challenges posed by technological developments by others, both now and in the future. Drawing on the extensive innovation expertise of all 30 Allies, we will further leverage our partnerships, including with the private sector and academia, to maintain our technological edge.[17]”

#### Emerging tech causes political friction

Gilli, 21 -- affiliate at CISAC and a Researcher at the NATO Defense College

[Andrea, "NATO, technological superiority, and emerging and disruptive technologies," NATO Defense College, 2021, jstor, accessed 6-4-22]

Emerging and disruptive technologies. First, the rise of several emerging and disruptive technologies — from artificial intelligence to quantum computing, hypersonic weapons to 5G networks - has led many to speculate that a new industrial revolution is coming. Whether this is correct will only be known ex post. What we do know, ex ante, is that there will be both a process of convergence among innovative countries, and a process of divergence between innovative and non-innovative countries.18 Predicting which countries will lead and which will lag is inevitably difficult. I Iowever, we can make some educated guesses about the factors that will play a key role. Because of the knowledge-intensive nature of the current technological transformation, countries excelling in R&l) and education are more likely to succeed.19 An important question concerns the ease of appropriating others’ knowledge and know-how. litis may determine the shape and intensity of international competition: if barriers to knowledge are high, the gap between the two groups will remain significant. If barriers are low, technological capabilities will be more diffused, with major implications for the structure of international politics.

Technological revolution and long-term change. Second, while the word “revolution” is often associated to sudden changes, technological revolutions have been, in reality, the product of cumulative processes.20This is because the adoption and diffusion of technolog)’ are slow and complicated, not least because of the need to invest in complementary assets. Deductive logic and available evidence about emerging and disruptive technologies suggest that their effects will be cumulative and this is particularly true for warfare.21 For instance, machine learning algorithms remain brittle and thus can be easily neutralized by enemy tactical or operational systems. Similarly, quantum computing will require major and increasing investments, and its integration into military forces will require parallel investments.

Technological transition and technology strategy. Third, given the previous two considerations, the challenge for NATO will be two-fold: 1) preserve its scientific, technological and industrial leadership in the so-called Third Industrial Revolution areas; and 2) consolidate its leadership in the so-called fourth Industrial Revolution domains. The challenge will be a delicate one to navigate. A good number of Allies is dramatically lagging behind in emerging and disruptive technologies. This technology and industrial gap is already creating political friction on issues such as taxation of digital transactions and data regulation. Without a serious attempt to modernize technologically, a two-tiered Alliance could start to take shape, and political difficulties will inevitably arise. In order to understand the challenges ahead, it is useful to look at NATO’s potential competitors.

### L: Unilateral Action

#### The plan’s bolt-from-the-blue nature collapses NATO cohesion- avoiding departures from incremental planning is key to Biden proving he’s not Trump

Sonne, 21 -- Washington Post national security reporter

[Paul Sonne, and Michael Birnbaum, "Biden administration takes more cooperative approach to its first high-level NATO meeting," Washington Post, 2-16-2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/nato-meeting-biden-trump/2021/02/16/b42d00d0-709f-11eb-a4eb-44012a612cf9\_story.html, accessed 6-4-2022]

Biden administration takes more cooperative approach to its first high-level NATO meeting

The Biden administration is preparing to strike a more cooperative tone at the first meeting of senior NATO officials since President Donald Trump departed office, as the alliance faces difficult questions about how to proceed with a frayed U.S.-Taliban peace agreement and when to withdraw the remaining forces from Afghanistan.

The change in approach by Washington comes as the 72-year-old military alliance looks to find its footing after a tumultuous four years dealing with Trump. The challenges are vast — from defending against Russia, evolving to consider threats posed by China, and extricating forces from Afghanistan without prompting a collapse of the nation’s NATO-backed government and military force.

Senior U.S. defense officials, in a briefing with reporters, signaled that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin wouldn’t offer any U.S. decisions on Afghanistan at the virtual two-day NATO meeting for defense ministers that begins Wednesday, as the Biden administration reviews its policy ahead of a May 1 deadline for the full withdrawal of U.S. troops set out in the peace agreement.

The senior officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the thinking of Pentagon leaders ahead of the NATO meeting, underscored that violence must be reduced in Afghanistan and said the Biden administration was reviewing the peace agreement in particular. One of the senior officials said the Taliban’s compliance with the deal — which U.S. officials have criticized — would be a key part of the review.

“It will play into how our government comes to a conclusion on where we should go,” one of the senior defense officials said, noting that the United States looked forward to consulting with NATO allies on the issue in the days and weeks to come.

The deliberations within the U.S. government over Afghanistan come as NATO faces an array of challenges, including in Iraq, where a NATO training and advisory mission, welcomed by the Biden administration, has continued amid attacks that Iraqi and Western officials have blamed on Iran-backed militias. On Monday night, coalition forces in Irbil were struck in an attack that left a civilian contractor dead and a U.S. service member injured.

Other challenges await: Russia is launching increasingly sophisticated cyber campaigns, including the most recent SolarWinds hack. Turkey, a NATO member, is blocking work and picking fights inside the alliance. And the United States, according to the senior U.S. defense officials, wants NATO to put China on its priority list.

Most notable at this week’s meeting is likely to be the change in style by the new U.S. administration toward its fellow NATO members. Trump often threatened NATO allies about their defense spending and used a bullying approach that led some world leaders to mock him and his freewheeling news conferences. But at NATO, worries about Washington extended beyond Trump’s tone.

European diplomats said they would sometimes wake up at 3 a.m. to check Trump’s Twitter feed to see if he had announced a sudden shift in U.S. military posture. They would spend weeks carefully laying out strategic plans with lower-level U.S. officials, only to have everything upended by a new pronouncement from the Oval Office. Sometimes, U.S. officials would come to them to try to find ways to work around Trump’s anger toward the alliance.

President Biden has said he will take a far different approach to NATO and has gone out of his way to signal support for the alliance, including by recording a video of a friendly phone call to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg last month. After Austin became defense secretary, the Pentagon scheduled Stoltenberg as his first call, and Biden has already halted a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany that Trump ordered, as the Pentagon evaluates what forces should be stationed where.

Some four weeks into the new administration, NATO diplomats are still sorting out the rules of the game inside the glassy alliance headquarters in Brussels. Trump’s ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, is gone, replaced for now by her former deputy, Chargé d’Affaires Douglas Jones. Biden has yet to announce his nominee for the post.

One significant shift so far, diplomats said, is that the Biden administration appears interested in hearing the views of allies on issues including operations in Afghanistan, where in addition to 2,500 U.S. troops, 8,000 forces from allied and partner nations remain.

Earlier this month, officials from the White House, State Department and Pentagon joined a conference call with NATO ambassadors, who detailed their countries’ positions on deployments and the security situation. A number of diplomats said it was a departure from Trump-era practice — and that they were delighted.

Stoltenberg signaled his eagerness to move on from the acrimony of the Trump era.

“It’s no secret that over the last four years, we had some difficult discussions inside NATO, but now we look to the future,” he told reporters Monday ahead of the defense ministers’ meeting. “And the future is that we now have an administration in the United States, in Washington, which is strongly committed to the transatlantic bond, to NATO, to Europe and North America working together.”

One of the senior U.S. defense officials underscored the point on Tuesday. “Consultation is really kind of the name of the game here,” the official said, describing the expected tone of the meeting.

The task of repairing the U.S. relationship with members of the alliance is significant, after some policymakers said their bandwidth was consumed by catering to Trump’s whims and acting as if he hadn’t upended the military organization.

### L: AI

#### NATO can’t agree on more than the basics when it comes to emerging tech- pushing the issue exposes divergences that collapse NATO’s drive

Heikkilä, 21 – Politico Europe correspondent

[Melissa Heikkilä, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," Politico, 3-29-21, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/, accessed 6-4-2022]

NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.

Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive.

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.

The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.

“We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO.

The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight.

David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus.

"I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said.

Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground.

For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications.

The pitch

NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said.

The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said.

The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems.

“If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said.

“We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued.

Mission impossible?

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context.

The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies.

“It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said:

That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly.

The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently.

There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control.

Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology.

These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban.

Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.”

Staying relevant

These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said.

She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body.

That could have consequences for human rights, too.

“NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign.

“Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said.

Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics.

#### AI progress is incremental now- anything more is divisive

Sharma, 22 -- Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

[Sanur, PhD, "NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis," Eurasia Review, 5-30-2022, https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/, accessed 6-4-2022]

NATO’s AI Adoption: Challenges and Limitations

The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability. The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process.

NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems.

Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems.

Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29

### L: Cyber

#### Any shift from ambiguity causes backlash

Lonergan, 22 -- Army Cyber Institute professor

[Erica, Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, former senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council, and Sara B. Moller "NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea," Politico, 4-27-22, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-4-2022]

Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.”

Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.”

This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time.

#### Refining cyber policy is hard political work that takes months

Lonergan, 22 -- Army Cyber Institute professor

[Erica, Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, former senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Atlantic Council, and Sara B. Moller "NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea," Politico, 4-27-22, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-4-2022]

With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.

### AT Link Turns

#### Ukraine approach is Goldilocks now- link turns are links

Smith, 22 -- Guardian's Washington DC bureau chief

[David, "Biden seeks to reassure Europe as he walks tightrope over Ukraine crisis," Guardian, 3-24-2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/24/biden-europe-visit-nato-ukraine-crisis, accessed 6-4-2022]

Biden seeks to reassure Europe as he walks tightrope over Ukraine crisis

President reiterated his message to Brussels that America is back, while he promises to impose sanctions on 300 members of the Russian parliament

He did not shove the prime minister of Montenegro at a photo-op, he did not call the British prime minister and German chancellor “losers” and he did not deride Nato as a bunch of grifters looking for a free lunch.

So low was the bar set by former US president Donald Trump that, merely by condemning Russia’s Vladimir Putin rather than gushing over his biceps, Joe Biden earned good will on his unity and resolve tour of Europe.

The president came to Brussels on Thursday with promises to accept up to 100,000 Ukrainian refugees fleeing the month-long Russian invasion, give $1bn in new humanitarian aid and impose sanctions on 300 members of the Russian parliament.

It was an attempt to project reassurance that Biden, born during the second world war, can emulate President Franklin Roosevelt’s “great arsenal of democracy” without stumbling into a third.

But the 79-year-old’s handshakes and whispers with France’s Emmanuel Macron and others at the Nato, G7 and European Council summits may put the seal on the Obama paradox: an American president more popular abroad than at home.

Gallup surveys conducted before Russia invaded Ukraine showed the image of US leadership making a significant recovery from the Trump era. “Between 2020 and 2021, American leadership saw double-digit gains in 20 of the 27 Nato members surveyed both years,” the polling firm said.

That stands in vivid contrast with Biden’s approval rating within the US, which this week fell to a new low of 40%, according to a Reuters/ Ipsos opinion poll. The survey found that 54% of Americans disapprove of his job performance as the country struggles with high inflation.

Biden’s approval rating matched Trump’s at this point in his presidency: both stood at 40% in mid-March in their second year in office. The relief of western allies at having America back at the table is unlikely to be reflected by domestic voters in the midterm elections in November.

That is why Republicans are hammering away at Biden by urging him to do more for Ukraine though with few specific details and, more loudly and convincingly to the electorate, by blaming him for soaring gas prices at home. They intend to prove the old adage that all politics is local.

The point was illustrated on prime time cable news television on Wednesday night. CNN’s Anderson Cooper opened his show with coverage of the war in Ukraine; Tucker Carlson, on the conservative Fox News channel, talked instead about supreme court nominee Ketanji Brown Jackson declining to offer a definition of “woman” during her Senate confirmation hearing.

CNN’s Reliable Sources newsletter noted: “As Cooper showed horrifying drone footage of the widespread devastation in Mariupol, Carlson showed his audience a sex-ed type graphic of the female reproductive system.”

It observed: “Four weeks after the war commenced, there are signs that fatigue is setting in. TV news ratings, for instance, have started to fall back to reality after ballooning early on. And perhaps another sign is the return of culture idiocy that is once again saturating channels like Fox and social media feeds.”

It is a further reminder to be grateful that Trump no longer has his finger on the Twitter button – or the nuclear one. The man who once posed the biggest threat to global democracy has been replaced in that role by Putin. Biden beat one and must now thwart the other.

So far that has meant a “Goldilocks” approach – not too hot, not too cold, not too weak, not too provocative. This received a boost on Thursday when Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy delivered a video address to Nato from Kyiv that did not, according to White House officials, include calls for a no-fly zone or Nato membership, giving Biden some breathing room.

## !: CHINA

### IL: Unity Key

#### NATO unity now deters Chinese invasion of Taiwan- weakness invites aggression

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "China is learning lessons from West's united response to Russia," Newsweek, 3-9-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/china-learning-lessons-wests-united-response-russia-ukraine-invasion-1686259, accessed 6-4-2022]

China Is Learning Lessons From West's United Response to Russia

China is watching the West's collective response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is learning lessons that may change its own calculations as it seeks to annex Taiwan, according to senior officials in Washington and London.

When the threat of economic sanctions failed to deter Vladimir Putin and the first of Russia's 150,000 troops began pouring into Ukrainian territory on February 24, Taiwan became a trending topic as observers feared China's President Xi Jinping would be emboldened to make good on his vow to capture the democratic island of 23.5 million people.

However, as Putin's forces failed to achieve their blitzkrieg goals and the war entered its second week, the thinking changed. Ukraine's leaders remained in Kyiv; its armed forces fought back and ordinary civilians joined the resistance. A galvanized NATO and the early effects of the West's unprecedented punishment on Russia's economy began to give China watchers pause.

Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu called the Ukrainian resistance an inspiration for the Taiwanese people. Taipei joined several Asian governments in imposing export controls on Russia and landed on Moscow's list of "unfriendly" countries this week.

Russia's forces continue their march toward Ukraine's capital and may eventually achieve their military objectives even as political goals—regime change and the submission of its public—remain out of reach. But the events of the past days have already made China more reluctant to invade Taiwan than just several months ago, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday.

"The view is both that it is likely to reinforce China's perspective on the seriousness with which we would approach an infringement on Taiwan and in the unity that they've seen between Europe and the United States, particularly in enacting sanctions," she said. "Not just that unity, but the impact of those sanctions I think are both things that are critical to their calculus and something that will be interesting for us to see how they learn those lessons."

In her opening remarks, Haines said China—"an unparalleled priority"—would prefer "coerced unification that avoids armed conflict." The Chinese government has been working to isolate Taiwan and undermine its elected leaders for years, she said. "At the same time, Beijing is preparing to use military force if it decides this is necessary."

In answer to a similar question, CIA Director William Burns said he "would not underestimate President Xi and the Chinese leadership's determination with regard to Taiwan." However, Burns said Beijing has been "surprised and unsettled" by the difficulties the Russians have encountered in Ukraine.

"Everything from the strength of the Western reaction, to the way in which Ukrainians have fiercely resisted," he said. "I think there's an impact on the Chinese calculus with regard to Taiwan."

Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, who heads the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers at the Russia-focused hearing that Taiwan and Ukraine were "two different things completely." He then hinted at the considerable U.S. military presence in Asia.

"I also believe that our deterrence posture in the Pacific puts a very different perspective on all of this," said Berrier. "We do know that [China] is watching very, very carefully what happens and how this plays out."

At a similar briefing of the U.K.'s Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said Beijing "does not want to associate too closely" with Russia's new status as a "global pariah." She left little doubt that NATO was setting a precedent with its united response and sending a message to China in the process.

"There's also the issue of the importance of showing strength as NATO," Truss said, "because the rest of the world will be watching, including China, on how the West continues to respond."

"Of course, if we see a weak NATO, that is likely to embolden China. So I see a tough policy on Russia and a tough policy on China as being complementary," she said.

#### China is watching to see if the unity lasts

Cheng, 22 -- CNBC China correspondent

[Evelyn Cheng, “China watches warily as Ukraine makes U.S., EU and Japan strengthen their alliance,” CNBC, 3-8-22, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/09/china-watches-as-ukraine-war-makes-us-eu-and-japan-show-unity.html, accessed 6-4-2022]

China watches warily as Ukraine makes U.S., EU and Japan strengthen their alliance

For China, the speed and severity with which the U.S. and its allies sanctioned Russia is a warning sign that could guide future economic and foreign policy.

“This is a very multilateral moment,” said Reva Goujon, senior manager for the China corporate advisory team at Rhodium Group.

Beijing has refused to call Russia’s attack on Ukraine an invasion. China has focused on promoting negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and it opposes the economic measures that have been taken against Russia.

Since taking office last year, President Joe Biden has pursued a strategy of restoring relationships with allies to put pressure on Beijing.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine nearly two weeks ago showed what those allies can do.

For China, the speed and severity with which the U.S. and its allies sanctioned Russia is a warning sign that could guide future economic and foreign policy.

Chinese officials have increased efforts to buttress their country’s self-reliance since President Donald Trump sanctioned telecommunications giant Huawei and slapped tariffs on billions of dollars’ worth of Chinese goods.

But Trump did all that singlehandedly — while simultaneously damaging ties with Europe and provoking uncertainty among U.S. allies in Asia.

The response to Ukraine has been anything but a go-it-alone move by the United States.

“Given the success that the U.S. has had in coordinating the financial sanctions and export controls not just with Europe but also with Japan, a key player in tech value chains — this is extremely alarming for China,” said Reva Goujon, senior manager for the China corporate advisory team at Rhodium Group.

“This is a very multilateral moment,” Goujon said. “At a high level, you would think China would benefit from [the U.S.] having a big distraction in Europe, but actually [this] only accentuates those policy debates over critical exposure and vulnerabilities to Chinese supply chains.”

From Germany to Japan, many countries have joined the U.S. in freezing the assets of Russian oligarchs, restricting access of Russia’s biggest banks to the global financial system, and cutting off Russia from critical technology.

China condemns ‘unilateral’ sanctions

On Monday, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said the friendship between China and Russia is “rock solid.”

He pointed specifically to a joint statement between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin last month, in which China and Russia described “international relations entering a new era” and “no limits” to their countries’ cooperation.

Beijing has refused to call Russia’s attack on Ukraine an invasion. China has focused on promoting negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, and it opposes the economic measures that have been taken against Russia.

China’s Foreign Ministry has repeatedly said it “opposes all illegal unilateral sanctions.” It has not elaborated on how the sanctions against Russia, which have been imposed by many countries, could be considered unilateral.

When asked about an “alliance of Western nations” pushing Russia out of the SWIFT banking network, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin said last week that “China does not agree with resolving issues with sanctions, still less unilateral sanctions that lack the basis of international law,” according to an English-language press conference transcript.

Later in the week, spokesperson Wang reiterated that position in response to a question about whether Western sanctions on trade with Russia would affect China.

Sanctions “only create serious difficulties to the economy and livelihood of relevant countries and further intensify division and confrontation,” he said.

China’s Europe balance

Escalating trade tensions between the U.S. and China in the last few years had already accelerated Beijing’s efforts to firm up ties with Europe. The Ukraine war threatens all that.

China’s “balancing act” of trying to quietly support Russia while keeping up relations with Europe is “going to be more and more difficult. That has consequences for trade links, primarily with the EU,” said Nick Marro, global trade leader at The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Marro noted that reputational risks rise for China “the more China tries to fudge its stance on Russia and focus its criticism on NATO and the U.S.”

“China was hoping to use the EU as a way to offset the pressure it was facing from the U.S.,” Marro said. “Right now, Europe sees Russia as an existential threat.”

“Right now the impact for China [from the sanctions] really is secondary,” Marro said. “This conflict raises bigger questions around industrial policy and China’s diplomatic relations with the West.”

China’s big economy

China is dealing with a host of its own economic challenges, from sluggish consumer demand to a slowdown in its massive property sector. Politically, Beijing is concerned with stability this year as leaders are set to meet in the fall to give Xi an unprecedented third term.

That all said, China is more entrenched in the global economy than Russia is and doesn’t have the same vulnerabilities — to sanctions, for example — that Russia has.

Europe relies on Russian oil and natural gas, but Russia is otherwise small in global terms, with an economy the size of the U.S. state of Texas.

Because Western trade with China is far greater than it is with Russia, a full trade war with China “would be quite costly [for the West] and in nobody’s interest,” said Alexander-Nikolai Sandkamp, a fellow at the German-based Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

“The West would welcome it if China took a stand against Russia and joined more actively the Western protests,” he said. “Now that China is remaining relatively neutral, that’s probably the best that we can expect.”

The Ukraine war and sanctions will likely lower global gross domestic product by only 0.2% this year, with a bigger impact in Europe, according to Tommy Wu, a lead economist at Oxford Economics.

China, Russia and SWIFT

Global finance provides a clear example of the limits on China’s ability to support Russia. Just days after the war began, the U.S. and EU pledged to remove some Russian banks from SWIFT, the standard interbank messaging system for financial institutions.

“If all Russian institutions are banned from joining the SWIFT network, then I think the level of political pressure is very different from what it is now,” said ­­Zhu Ning, professor of finance and deputy dean at the Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance.

“Then any attempt to avoid punishment” would be considered “complicit,” he said. “Quite tricky for Chinese financial institutions.”

The Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank announced last week it was suspending activities related to Russia and Belarus.

Short-lasting Western unity?

On the other hand, there’s also the matter of general political dysfunction in the United States, where the Democrat and Republican parties are increasingly unable to work together to achieve even widely supported domestic goals.

Rhodium Group’s Goujon pointed out that the U.S. presidential election in 2024 poses a risk to how long the unity lasts among U.S. allies.

“I think the West is very caught up in the moment, ... this idea that the U.S.-led liberal order is back, Germany has woken up, even Switzerland,” she said.

“But there are other countries like Mexico, like India, that we see embrace the Chinese narrative of the multipolar order more readily,” she said, “and that’s where I think China is waiting for the heat of the war to die.”

Regardless, the Biden administration is trying hard to unify the world’s democracies — and since the Ukraine war started, more of them seem to be listening.

#### Unity deters China Taiwan invasion

Business Standard, 22 ["Int'l unity over Russia-Ukraine war makes China cautious towards Taiwan," 4-4-22, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/int-l-unity-over-russia-ukraine-war-makes-china-cautious-towards-taiwan-122040400198\_1.html, accessed 6-4-2022]

Int'l unity over Russia-Ukraine war makes China cautious towards Taiwan

While similarities between Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be drawn in a linear fashion, strong deductions can be made with regard to China's behavior toward Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

China under Xi Jinping will be cautious and calibrated in its behaviour towards Taiwan after witnessing the international community's unity and reaction after Russia's war on Ukraine.

While similarities between Taiwan and Ukraine cannot be drawn in a linear fashion, strong deductions can be made with regard to China's behavior toward Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

The Ukraine-Russia crisis has put forward the best worst-case scenario for Chinese President Xi Jinping to calculate their move for their future plan for Taiwan and could also expect what the international community can do if someone tries to invade in a peaceful life, analysed International Forum for Rights and Security (IFFRAS), Canada based international think tank.

"For China, and Xi in particular, the big lessons will be drawn from a careful reading of the international community's reaction toward what Putin calls Russia's "special military operation" aiming to "demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine" under the logic that "Russia cannot feel safe, develop and exist with a constant threat emanating from the territory of modern Ukraine." The outcome has so far been international condemnation and boycotts of Russia, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU -- resulting in Russia becoming a "pariah" state, International Forum for Rights and Security said.

The unity in the international community in imposing punitive sanctions on Russia disturbs China's larger geopolitical plans that there is a growing united front between the US and Europe -- with the crisis in Ukraine bridging the gap, it added.

If this united front strengthens, it will not only be a debacle for China's global ambitions; it will also have ramifications for China's plans for Taiwan.

Besides, Taiwan will be a much harder bargain for China. At this juncture, Beijing -- given its leanings toward Moscow -- cannot afford to be caught in the crosshairs of the US and Europe.

Notably, in 2020, the United States, Department of Defence said that the Chinese military is "likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the mainland by force."

Even this year, in January, the Chinese Ambassador to US Qin Gang warned the US and said that the US could face "military conflict" with China over the status of Taiwan.

China's recent activities have only fuelled speculation about China's plan to invade Taiwan.

According to the think-tanker, if this is the case, then the Ukraine-Russia crisis serves as a litmus test for China.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's move in Ukraine is important for Xi's next move in Taiwan in two ways:

First, Ukraine considers itself a sovereign nation while Putin adopts a "Soviet Union mentality" similarly, to China's "Middle Kingdom mentality" under the "Chinese dream" of "rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" through "reunification with Taiwan."

The logic is to get all the foreign territories "back" into their country like Ukraine for Putin and Taiwan for Xi.

And the second one is that both the countries with their respective leaders are the chieftain of all things under their autocratic political apparatus.

According to the think tank, the Us has adopted a different approach towards Russia, as compared to North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Syria. The country has imposed financial sanctions and restrictions on a majority of Russian oligarchs and state-owned banking and financial service providers, as well as Putin and many of his associates, on the asset control office's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.

The US Department of Commerce has targeted Russia's oil refining sector. Furthermore, the Us has also imposed a ban on Russian alcoholic beverages, seafood and non-industrial diamonds. To counter Russia, the US even imposed economic sanctions on Belarus which supports Russia. Not the only US but the EU and Japan have also imposed financial restrictions on Russia and Belarus.

Russia's "most-favoured-nation" status was revoked on March 11 by the US along with its NATO allies, G7 and the EU, this was considered a major blow to Russia's economy.

Notably, the international communities' reaction toward Russia's military operations carries a strong message for China.

Ukraine-Russia crisis feared the US that there is the possibility that China could also use the same tactics as Russia and could attack Taiwan. Responding to the question of whether "the US would come to Taiwan's defence in the event of an attack by China, Biden in October answered, "Yes, we have a commitment to do that."

Learning from the Ukraine-Russia crisis, China would be cautious to take any further steps against Taiwan, a think tank reported.

### !: Authoritarianism

#### Taiwan is key to counter Chinese authoritarian expansion

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "Why is Taiwan important to the United States?," Newsweek, 6-3-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/why-taiwan-important-united-states-china-1712363, accessed 6-4-2022]

"One thing is very important on top of these geopolitical or strategic calculations: Taiwan is a vibrant democracy," said Professor Yeh-chung Lu, chair of the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University in Taipei. "Especially to the U.S. general public, Taiwan sounds more like an asset than a liability, because we all belong to this international democratic community."

Taiwan, among the top suppliers of semiconductors to the United States, has also become part of Biden's band of "techno-democracies," Lu says—a multilateral and ideological alliance to counter China's digital authoritarianism.

Lu believes the American public's strong support for Taiwan also comes from the different ways Taipei and Beijing have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic.

"In this China is self-defeating because of Chinese government policy toward its own people," he told Newsweek. "I'm not saying Taiwan is always a role model, but on many fronts, Taiwan is doing better than China in terms of transparency, etc."

Taiwan wasn't always a democracy. It was ruled as a one-party state until, thanks in part to American encouragement, the government accepted democratic reforms in the 1980s. The Taiwanese public voted in the first direct presidential election in 1996 which brought about the first transition of power four years later.

In 2022, Taiwan is a different story, Lu said. "The fact is the PRC never ruled Taiwan for one day, so for the general in Taiwan, we are not very familiar with the CCP, and I believe the supermajority in Taiwan wouldn't like to be ruled by the CCP."

Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said: "Today's geopolitical environment centers around perceived competition between democracies and autocracies for global influence, a sentiment that stands at the very core of the United States' bilateral relationship with Taiwan."

"Trade and security-related matters often dominate the conversation surrounding U.S.-Taiwan relations, but that is not why Taiwan matters to the United States. It matters because the island nation's very existence demonstrates that democracy and democratic values can thrive a mere 100 nautical miles from mainland China, amongst a population that is primarily Mandarin-speaking," he argues.

"Put differently, the U.S. government and the American people understand that what China fears most is not Taiwan per se, it is Taiwan's democracy. So, when Americans see China ratcheting up pressure against the island nation and Beijing issuing threats to reunify by force, they do not just see a threat to liberty, they see themselves."

President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan would seem to agree. She wrote in Foreign Affairs last October: "Emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, authoritarian regimes are more convinced than ever that their model of governance is better adapted than democracy to the requirements of the twenty-first century. This has fueled a contest of ideologies, and Taiwan lies at the intersection of contending systems.

"Vibrantly democratic and Western, yet influenced by a Chinese civilization and shaped by Asian traditions, Taiwan, by virtue of both its very existence and its continued prosperity, represents at once an affront to the narrative and an impediment to the regional ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party."

#### Authoritarian expansion spurs global nuclear war

**Orts 18**, University of Pennsylvania Guardsmark Professor at The Wharton School

[Eric, “Foreign Affairs: Six Future Scenarios (and a Seventh),” 6-27-18, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/foreign-affairs-six-future-scenarios-seventh-eric-orts, accessed 2020]

7. Fascist Nationalism. There is another possible future that the Foreign Affairs scenarios do not contemplate, and it’s a dark world in which Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, and others construct regimes that are **authoritarian and nationalist**. Fascism is possible in the United States and elsewhere if big business can be seduced by promises of riches in return for the institutional keys to democracy. Perhaps Foreign Affairs editors are right to leave this dark world out, for it would be very dark: **nationalist wars** with risks of **escalation into global nuclear conflict**, further digital militarization (even Terminator-style scenarios of smart military robots), and unchecked climate disasters.

The global challenges are quite large – and the six pieces do an outstanding job of presenting them. One must remain optimistic and engaged, hopeful that we can overcome the serious dangers of tribalism, nationalism, and new fascism. These "isms” of our time stand in the way of solving some of our biggest global problems, such as the risks of thermonuclear war and global climate catastrophe.

### AT No War

#### Diversionary theory and PLA hawks make Taiwan war likely, but not inevitable- credible deterrence is key

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "Will China invade Taiwan?," Newsweek, 6-1-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-invasion-joe-biden-1711647, accessed 6-4-2022]

Christina Chen, an assistant research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan's top military think tank, tells Newsweek the "likelihood of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait in the near term is getting high."

Chen believes Xi will secure an unprecedented third term in office this November, but says the legitimacy of his rule "will be greatly challenged" as a result of an economic downturn, created in part by Xi's sweeping zero-COVID policy.

"This mounting internal pressure is pushing Xi and the CCP leadership to divert internal opposition through more external aggression," Chen says. "There are signs that China will escalate and cause conflicts," she notes. This is the backdrop against which Biden's comments should be read.

That China will "go the military route on Taiwan" isn't an inevitability, argues Bryce Barros, an analyst with the Alliance for Securing Democracy, a think tank at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

"However, I do think hawks within the CCP and PLA might become more emboldened to take military action against Taiwan in some way as it becomes more apparent that Taiwan will not peacefully unify," he says.

Taiwan's public has shown little interest in being governed from Beijing, and its government has gradually increased the country's defense spending in recent years. Clear commitments from Washington, like the one given by Biden, may reinforce China's belief that the U.S. plans to foil any military action by Beijing, Barros says.

Whether China invades Taiwan will revolve around the central theory of deterrence, chiefly as it pertains to the United States, postwar Asia's foremost power. To deter Beijing from a course of military action, both Taipei and Washington will need to have a clear understanding of Chinese interests and motives, and seek to shape China's own perceptions of a potential attack by raising the costs of war.

According to Washington-based defense analyst Gerald Brown, a commitment to defend Taiwan on paper isn't enough—it must be matched by capabilities.

"We definitely need to worry about having the capability to beat back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and we must actively ensure we rapidly work towards this," he tells Newsweek.

"Simultaneously, a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is already incredibly difficult and costly for the PRC, and while U.S. forces are not where they need to be, a U.S.-Chinese war is something the PRC desperately wants to avoid if possible," says Brown, who advocates "strategic clarity" to reinforce deterrence.

"Now, having the capability is critical here, but, if the CCP is unsure that the U.S. would step in and it has no commitment to do so, not having the proper capability to defend Taiwan plus having room to back out would actually serve as a far less effective deterrent," he says.

"The CCP may well assume that without a definitive capability to defend Taiwan and with the lack of a formal commitment allowing room for the U.S. to maneuver out and not defend Taiwan, if the PRC launched an attack the U.S. would be compelled to stay out, encouraging Chinese aggression," Brown says.

Notwithstanding Biden's pledge to defend Taiwan, the question of American involvement goes beyond whether Chinese forces can be stopped. "It's not binary, everything is subjective and exists on a spectrum," Brown argues. "A lot boils down to how the CCP views the environment."

Therefore, Biden's belief that an invasion of Taiwan won't be attempted must first be built on a credible deterrent, which in the president's view appears to include the shared concerns of U.S. allies and partners, all of which would favor a continuation of the status quo above conflict.

But keeping the peace will also require tactful diplomacy. Some fear that mixed messages from the Biden administration could cause Beijing to miscalculate and trigger a war many are seeking to avoid.

### AT US Won’t Intervene

#### US would intervene- strategic interests and Biden’s comments prove

Feng, 22 -- Newsweek contributing editor, Asia

[John Feng, "Will U.S. defend Taiwan if China invades? Experts weigh in," Newsweek, 6-1-2022, https://www.newsweek.com/us-taiwan-china-invasion-1712083, accessed 6-4-2022]

Ely Ratner, the Pentagon's assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, told a House committee hearing in March that the U.S. response in such a scenario would differ from how it's supporting Ukraine. "I'm confident that some of our closest partners would be with us in a Taiwan contingency," he said.

Last week, while standing beside Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan at a press conference in Tokyo, Biden said the U.S. would become military involved in the event of a Chinese invasion, even though he believed such a move "will not happen" and "will not be attempted."

Although Biden later disagreed, his remarks appeared to break with over four decades of careful dancing around the question, a deliberate position known as "strategic ambiguity," in which the U.S. doesn't publicly commit or dismiss the possibility of defending Taiwan militarily.

The End of Ambiguity?

Taiwan, meanwhile, says it would be ready to fight alone, although it has asked the U.S. to expedite arms sales as PLA capabilities continue to grow.

While some may argue otherwise, subject matter experts believe China already assumed America would intervene, long before the president's apparent slip of the tongue.

"For Beijing, Biden's remarks may reveal the attitude to the current 'answer' to U.S. strategic ambiguity," says Hung Tzu-chieh, an assistant research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, Taiwan's top military think tank. "I don't think Biden's remarks will change Beijing's strategic thinking, as Beijing has long considered the possibility of U.S. military intervention."

"For example, China has continued to develop its naval power and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Western Pacific over the past decades. Its purpose is mainly to target the U.S. military," Hung says.

The PLA's rapidly developing long-range strike capabilities—both conventional and nuclear—are unlikely to be used on Taiwan either, their range already capable of reaching Guam.

According to Su Tzu-yun, an associate researcher at Taipei's INDSR (Institute for National Defense and Security Research), the U.S. approach has changed. "President Biden has referenced a commitment to defend Taiwan several times," he says. "These are clear strategic signals to deter China's military adventurism."

"[U.S.] policy is clear, but its strategy is ambiguous; that is, its objective of maintaining the [Taiwan Strait] status quo is clear, but its means are flexible," Su argues.

America's Changing Sentiment Towards Taiwan

The defense analyst lists obvious geostrategic reasons for why the U.S. might want to defend Taiwan, which sits in the center of the so-called first island chain that hems in China. The sea lines around Taiwan are busy, carrying 90 percent of Japan's crude oil and 76 percent of its liquified natural gas—both major lifelines for Tokyo, Su says.

The Bashi Channel, a waterway separating Taiwan from the Philippines to its south, is also critical for the defense of the continental U.S., as Chinese submarines exiting the passage into the Western Pacific can launch ballistic missiles capable of reaching the West Coast, Su's analysis shows.

Sean King, senior vice president of New York-based Park Strategies, believes Biden's comments were sincere. "He voted for the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979 as a senator (so, he clearly understands the issue) and has now said three times that we'd defend Taiwan in case of mainland attack."

"It's not a change in U.S. policy but does signal growing American sentiment in Taiwan's favor," he said.

## !: RUSSIA

### !: Russia War

#### NATO unity resurgence key to contain Russia to Ukraine

Livingston, 22 -- Texas Tribune Washington bureau chief

[Abby Livingston, "Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, 4-6-22, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives/, accessed 6-4-2022]

That alliance is having a renaissance in Europe, as the United States and its allies are trying to prevent the Russian invasion from spilling into NATO countries. Most mainstream foreign policy experts credit NATO’s efficacy for containing the Russian aggression to Ukraine.

Republican U.S. Rep. Michael McCaul of Austin is the top House Republican on foreign affairs and voted to support NATO. On Wednesday, he sported a blue-and-gold Ukrainian ribbon on his suit jacket at the Capitol.

He told The Texas Tribune that NATO countries are “stepping up” in ways some countries had lagged before. A frequent conservative critique of NATO is that many European countries fall short of the expected standard that all member countries spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense.

“NATO is more unified than it’s ever been. Germany now is putting in 2% of their GDP. And they are sending weapons and they are training,” he said.

NATO bonds further frayed in recent years, as Trump regularly railed against the alliance. But his criticism did lead to several NATO countries deciding to increase their defense spending.

Everything changed six weeks ago when Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, a country on the Eastern European frontier that long aspired to join the organization. Several NATO countries located near Ukraine, like Poland, are most impacted by the refugee exodus from Ukraine.

#### Extinction

David **Rothkopf 3-3**, CEO, The Rothkopf Group. Citing: Lt. Gen. Doug Lute, Former U.S. Ambassador, NATO. Former Deputy US National Security Adviser; Bill Taylor, US Ambassador, Ukraine; Jon Wolfsthal, Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program; Joe Cirincione, Distinguished Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, "How the West Can Help Ukraine," Daily Beast, 03/03/2022, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-the-west-can-help-ukraine>.

There is a consensus among Western leaders and strategic thinkers about how to respond to Russia’s brutal and unjustifiable aggression against **Ukraine**. Unprecedented and sweeping economic sanctions, moving NATO forces toward its eastern frontiers, and providing **substantial** lethal **aid** to Ukraine are the pillars of this response.

While this approach may not be **sufficient** to stop Russian forces from seizing Kyiv, Kharkiv, and other cities, it has already aided Ukraine in **slowing** Russian offensives, and should be useful in **supporting** a **protracted** Ukrainian **insurgency** against the Russian occupiers. If the will to maintain economic pressure on Russia remains strong enough for long enough, it could also create **real incentives** for Russia to negotiate and, perhaps, to withdraw.

But in the next few days, it is already **clear** that Russia is going to increase its pressure on Ukraine. Its tactics—which have already included indiscriminate missile and artillery attacks on civilian centers and the use of prohibited weapons, including cluster and thermobaric munitions—will grow even **more inhumane**. The civilian toll will rise. In all likelihood, it will **rise** greatly.

Vladimir Putin, frustrated with his progress to date, sensing what he must do next and anticipating the Western response, has prepared the ground for his **stepped-up attacks** by rattling his **nuclear saber**. He has asserted that he has put his “defensive” nuclear forces on **alert**. Earlier, he made reference to what he asserted would be the **unprecedented** costs should NATO or others step in to try to stop his invasion of his democratic neighbor.

His goal was to forestall any consideration of NATO putting troops on the ground to stop him or of introducing any other military efforts to counter his onslaught, such as air attacks. His warning was effective. Western leaders have ruled out no-fly-zones or other approaches that might be both difficult to implement and carry with them the risk of triggering “World War III” or a devastating nuclear exchange.

So pressure to do more is likely to grow even as the options for doing more have been severely limited.

Not only does this situation create real, deep conundrums for Western planners and profound unease for the otherwise brave defenders of Ukraine, it raises real long-term questions.

Notably, if the **conclusion** from this war is that nuclear-armed states have the ability to do **whatever they want** to their neighbors, however cruel and unjustified, because the risks of fighting back against them are too high, the world will **not** be left a safer place.

Consider for example, Putin’s calculations regarding **further** reconstituting his warped vision of a Russian empire if he were to feel that NATO’s **Article 5 guarantees**—that all members will come to the aid of any member who is attacked—were actually just a **paper tiger**. Would he feel that he could roll his tanks **into Latvia** without fear of being challenged because so many Western leaders consider the threat of nuclear war too high to ever challenge him?

Will NATO—at the moment its renaissance is being celebrated—actually reveal to its principal adversary that it is not really up to the job for which it was intended?

These are not easy questions to answer. The risks of **nuclear war are** as **real** as they are ghastly. But the risks of giving all the world’s Putins the **license** to run roughshod through their neighborhoods are also, as history shows, **profound**.

Lt. Col. Alexander Vindman, former National Security Council (NSC) director for European affairs, said to me, “Western governments are terrified of Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling. We’ve lost our nerve in the face of shallow threats.”

Tom Nichols, a long-time professor at the U.S. Naval War College and writer of the “Peacefield” newsletter for The Atlantic, framed the situation in the following way: “The war in Ukraine is brutal and horrific. But none of that is an argument for a plunge into the abyss.”

But, Nichols cautions, “We are all suffering from the ‘CNN effect,’ watching this devastation in real time. It’s hard not to be emotional about it—I am—but a NATO intervention would be the greatest gift Putin could ask for and risks catastrophic consequences."

What options do we have?

Lt. Gen. Doug **Lute**, former U.S. ambassador to NATO and former deputy U.S. national security adviser, recommends: “We should focus on anti-armor Javelins and anti-air Stinger missiles, getting as many as possible **as fast as possible** into the hands of Ukrainian forces and **setting up** re**supply networks** in Poland and Romania to sustain the effort over time. These are easy to transport and distribute, relatively simple to use and have already proven effective against Russian forces. We should be **stockpiling** these now and providing truck transport that can be **handed off** to Ukrainians at the border. We should take steps to ensure communications for the Ukrainian regime with secure digital comms, including satellite access. The ability of the leadership to communicate is crucial to holding together the military and the civilian resistance.”

Lute emphasizes that **now is the time** to take such actions while Russia’s attentions are focused **away** from the western part of the country—the ones that border the EU—and where a **long-term resistance** is likely to be based. He also advises that more of the **private sector** should be mobilized (as has happened with recent energy company and airline efforts to pull out of Russia) and that we continue to “pay attention to the flanks” by cultivating the engagement and support of potential new NATO members like Finland and Sweden.

On my Deep State Radio podcast this week, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bill Taylor added that the U.S. could provide **more** forms of technical **assistance** like helping the Ukrainian Air Force counter Russian jamming of their radio frequencies, providing Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) while we still can get such larger weapons systems into the country, and considering new sanctions like those targeting Russia’s oil sector. (Canada has just announced energy sector sanctions against Russia.)

But what do we do about the moral hazard associated with caving in to Putin’s nuclear gamesmanship? The former NSC senior director for arms control and nuclear proliferation in the Obama White House, Jon Wolfsthal, said: “Putin’s threats are designed to shield him from US/NATO response while he takes conventional action against Ukraine. While abhorrent, it has been clear all along that we were not going to commit troops to Ukraine for a variety of reasons, including the risk of nuclear war (President Biden is 100% right on that). I don’t think [Putin] will use nukes, knows it would be suicide, and not clear his military would support that action.”

Wolfsthal continues, “I don’t agree that failure to send troops or ‘defend’ Ukraine adds to the danger that he might roll into a NATO state. I believe that he is very well-aware that any kinetic move against NATO territory would trigger a full Article 5 response. This is one of the reasons he has moved against non-NATO states and why is he so adamant that Ukraine not join NATO. He knows he would never be able to reabsorb it into greater mother Russia. His attack has united NATO in a remarkable way. And it has shown NATO states that they can be strong and protected without making nuclear threats. And it shows how extreme and unhinged making nuclear threats are.”

Joe Cirincione, a distinguished fellow at the Quincy Institute and nuclear non-proliferation expert and advocate, observed, “Nuclear weapons are praised by most theorists as providing stability, as keeping the peace in Europe. But here we have Putin using **nuclear weapons** as a **shield** to wage conventional war—the kind of war in Europe nuclear weapons were **supposed** to prevent.”

While he concurs our current strategies are effective and may define the limits of what we can and should do and while he also does not believe Putin would attack NATO, after the conflict, Cirincione argues: “After the war, we will have a brief window to discuss not just what our policies should be going forward but to examine what went wrong with our policies in the past. This was not supposed to happen. Either the invasion or the nuclear risks. So, why did it? What could we have done better? I think we have to go back to the 1990s and examine our policies for NATO expansion (Should we have moved so quickly? Could we have reassured Russia more fully?). But also on the nuclear front.”

In a recent article, Cirincione cited a 2007 warning from former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and former Sen. Sam Nunn, that “unless we moved step by step to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons, we would “be **compelled** to enter a **new nuclear era** that will be more **precarious**, **psychologically disorienting**, and economically even **more costly** than was Cold War deterrence.”

Cirincione says we are now “in that world.” He adds: “If we assume that there must be a diplomatic termination of this war (it is possible that it could end with a palace coup against Putin but I wouldn’t bet on it), then we are going to have to offer Putin some face-saving way out. We are going to have to address his legitimate security concerns (and he does have some).”

Among the suggestions he favors are, “pulling our 100-150 tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe in exchange for reduction in his force, restoring the ban on intermediate-range nuclear weapons that ended when Trump tore up the INF treaty, getting rid of the pointless missile interceptors and silos we deployed in Poland and Romania that Putin fears could be used to house offensive nuclear weapons… getting real about the ‘strategic stability talks’ to include immediate, deep reductions in nuclear forces, making mutual declarations to never use nuclear weapons first and making that the international nuclear gold standard all states should follow, [with] mutual steps to reduce the alert levels of nuclear forces by taking them off hair trigger alert and (as some already do) taking the warheads off of the delivery vehicles.”

Lute says, “Before Putin backs down, he will double down.” That is certainly true. But a **growing consensus** is that if the U.S. and our allies **maintain** our resolve and our unity and by **ratchet**ing **up** existing measures rather than taking steps that risk escalation, in the end Putin and the Russians will likely have to **withdraw** from Ukraine without having achieved any of their major goals.

# AFF

## 2AC

### 2AC: ET Thumper

#### NATO emerging tech co-op high now

Hudson, 22 -- former managing editor of the Wall Street Journal's European edition

[Richard L., and Florin Zubascu, "Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research," Science|Business, 4-7-2022, https://sciencebusiness.net/news/science-goes-war-western-allies-step-collaboration-military-research, accessed 6-5-2022]

Science goes to war: western allies step up collaboration in military research

The war in Ukraine prompts a series of new R&D collaborations on quantum, hypersonic and other military technologies – but also stirs some academic controversy in Europe

The war in Ukraine moved directly into the lab this week, with western governments announcing a series of new measures to coordinate their military research, including on quantum technologies and hypersonic missiles.

But the shift isn’t without controversy, as some European academics urged the EU to keep its civilian and defence research separate.

The military build-up took several steps, with NATO announcing a coordinated, multi-country research programme, and the US, Australia and UK setting plans for expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research. It followed a NATO leaders’ meeting last autumn in which the strategy was set; but the scale and scope of the detailed measures announced this week were massive.

DIANA launch

Jens Stoltenberg, secretary general of NATO, announced this week that the UK and Estonia will host a joint military R&D programme involving research centres around the alliance. The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is expected to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on defence technologies and procurement.

The innovation accelerator will cover projects in artificial intelligence, big data, quantum technologies, biotechnology, hypersonics and space. “The goal of DIANA is to support deep technologies companies that contribute to defence,” said Estonian defence minister Kalle Laanet.

In the UK, Imperial College London will be the host organisation, coordinating what the UK government called “deep tech test centres” for military technologies, and a “virtual marketplace” to connect start-ups with investors and procurers.

The project is part of a broader NATO initiative to boost military research cooperation, that will ultimately involve as many as 60 sites. On 6 April, Denmark’s DTU research organisation said it and partners had been chosen to set up a NATO testing centre in Copenhagen for quantum technologies. Further announcements on other sites to be included are expected in coming weeks.

AUKUS cooperation

About the same time as the NATO news, the White House announced on 5 April that US, UK and Australian leaders had agreed to “accelerate investments to deliver generation-after-next quantum capabilities.” The R&D focus, it said, will be on “positioning, navigation and timing”, in trials over the next three years. Quantum sensors can provide ultra-precise atomic clocks, to guide ships or missiles.

The AUKUS Quantum Arrangement, as they called it, is part of a broader defence pact last year among the three nations in response to growing western concerns about Russia and China. The initial step last year was an agreement by the US and UK to supply nuclear-powered submarines to Australia – undercutting a rival French offer. But the latest discussions, as the Australian prime minister visited Washington, shows the three-way alliance widening to include other military technologies.

And separately from the overtly military news, on 5 April Finnish and US officials signed a joint statement pledging cooperation on a long list of quantum topics, including research, supply chains, education and values. The statement focuses on quantum benefits to the economy and society, and notably excludes mention of defence applications.

What role for Horizon Europe?

But the rapid-fire string of western announcements signals a seismic shift in how governments handle the delicate question of military versus civilian research. The European Commission is planning to expand the use of research funds for ‘dual-use’ defence technologies, but it’s unclear whether money from Horizon Europe, its €95.5 billion programme for civilian research, will actually end up being spent on developing weapons.

### 2AC: No NATO Unity

#### Post-Ukraine unity is collapsing

Lucas, 22 -- Center for European Policy Analysis nonresident fellow

[Edward Lucas, "NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date," Foreign Policy, 6-7-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/07/nato-ukraine-russia-war-alliance-reform-geopolitics-military/, accessed 6-19-2022]

NATO Is Out of Shape and Out of Date

With the bloc’s unity over Ukraine showing cracks, NATO needs an overhaul.

Is NATO brain-dead or back in business? Less than three years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron famously diagnosed “the brain death of NATO.” Rhetoric aside, his point was fair at the time: Europe’s dearth of strategic thinking combined with the unpredictability of U.S. policy under then-President Donald Trump spelled serious trouble for the Cold War-era alliance.

Now, all talk is of NATO’s revival and resurgence. Russia’s war on Ukraine has given an urgent new relevance to the bloc’s core mission of territorial defense. NATO members appear to have found a new unity of purpose, supplying Ukraine with weapons, reassessing the threat from Russia, hiking defense budgets, and bolstering the security of the alliance’s eastern frontier. But the “honeymoon,” in the words of Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, was brief. As the war drags on, strains are showing, and the alliance is still shaky.

It’s true that NATO has come a long way. Only 14 years ago, the alliance’s top-secret threat assessment body, MC 161, was explicitly prohibited by its political masters from even considering any military danger from Russia in its scenarios. The pressure came not only from notorious Russia-huggers such as Germany but also from the United States, which was eager to keep east-west ties friendly. The Kremlin, the conventional wisdom insisted, was a partner, not an enemy. As a result, NATO’s most vulnerable members—Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—remained second-class allies. They were in the bloc, but only on paper. There were no significant outside forces on their territory, and the alliance expressly refrained from making contingency plans to reinforce or even defend them in the event of attack. Poland demanded such plans and was told that they could be drawn up to defend the country against an attack by Belarus—but not by Russia.

Since Russia’s first attack on Ukraine in 2014, NATO plans and deployments have become more serious. There are 1,000-strong tripwire forces in the three Baltic states and a larger U.S. force in Poland. Since the start of the invasion in February, that presence has increased sharply. Moreover, two of the most advanced smaller military powers in Europe, Finland and Sweden, are banging on the alliance’s door. Assuming objections from Turkey can been smoothed out, they will be members by year’s end. That will fundamentally change the military geography of northeastern Europe.

Still more important is the stiffening of spines among the members. Trump’s much publicized distaste for NATO was based, in part, on the European members’ chronic underspending. At one point, the exasperated U.S. leader even tried to present a bill to his German counterpart, Chancellor Angela Merkel. Now, defense spending is rising across the alliance. That makes NATO an easier sell in Washington, especially as the case for U.S. engagement in European security is bolstered by the war in Ukraine.

Germany, the most notorious laggard, is suddenly splurging money on its decrepit armed forces—tanks that can’t trundle, ships that can’t go to sea, and soldiers who exercise with broomsticks instead of guns. It has agreed to meet NATO’s defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of GDP, set in 2006 and largely ignored thereafter. The latest country to announce a big hike in defense spending is Spain, currently lagging at barely 1 percent of GDP. The prime minister announced that this will double by 2024. That sets the scene nicely for the NATO summit in the Spanish capital later this month.

Yet look a little more closely, and the picture is far less rosy. Notwithstanding its apparent unity of purpose since the start of Russia’s war, NATO looks out of shape and out of date. In the run-up to their summit, the allies have been furiously haggling over the language in their new strategic concept, which will frame the alliance’s mission for the coming years and will be unveiled in Madrid. What will it say about Russia? About China? What sacrifices and risks are the member states really willing to accept? Are they willing to pool sovereignty in order to streamline decision-making?

Nothing in recent weeks suggests that these questions will get clear answers. For starters, the 30-strong alliance is unwieldy. In military terms, only a handful of members matter—above all, the United States—but in political terms, even little Luxembourg and Iceland get a voice. Worse, the political divides are huge. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a semi-authoritarian state that flirts with Russia and fumes at what it considers European meddling over human rights. Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban is taking a different but downward path, fusing wealth and power into a new system of control at home and undermining U.S. and European attempts to put pressure on Russia and China. Macron’s relentless posturing and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s foot-dragging create constant obstacles and distractions. The two leader’s weaknesses, on glorious display since the start of the war, have already enriched the language: Scholzen is a German neologism for “dither,” while makronic in Polish (and its equivalent in Ukrainian) can be roughly translated as “vacuous grandstanding while doing nothing.”

Macron and Scholz corrode decision-making with their foibles and thus place a big question mark over the alliance’s credibility and cohesion. Any threat or provocation from Russia is unlikely to be clear or conveniently timed. More likely it will be something deliberately ambiguous, such as a Russian drone that “accidentally” strays onto the territory of a front-line state and hits a target. Some countries would favor a tough response. Others would fear escalation and want dialogue. Still others would take the ambiguity as a convenient excuse to do nothing. Would the 30—soon to be 32—national representatives in the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s deliberative body, really make a speedy and tough decision on how to react? More likely, some of them would plead for delay, diplomacy, and compromise. Those actually facing the possibility of attack would be far more hawkish, preferring a sharp military confrontation to even the smallest Russian victory. “Not one inch, not one soul,” a senior military figure from one of the Baltic states, speaking anonymously, told me. “We have seen what they did in Ukraine.”

The political weaknesses are matched by military ones. By far the most important country in the alliance is the United States. The U.S. security guarantee to Europe—with its threat of devastating conventional and, if necessary, nuclear response to any attack—is the cornerstone of the alliance. “All for one and one for all” sounds fine, but nobody in the Kremlin will tremble at the thought of Spanish, Dutch, or Canadian displeasure. Yet the result of this is a colossal dependence on U.S. capabilities, ranging from ammunition and spare parts (of which European countries’ stockpiles are notoriously skinny) to military transports that move forces quickly and efficiently over long distances. Even if Europe’s new defense spending plans materialize, they will not change the fact that only U.S. armed forces can move with the scale and speed necessary to defend territory from a country like Russia.

Conversely, the countries that most need defending—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are the least able to bear the burden themselves. They need advanced weapons, particularly for air and missile defense, that they cannot afford themselves. The thin neck of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, the so-called Suwalki Gap, is particularly vulnerable to attack from Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, from which Russia attacked Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania both want a big U.S. military presence—either a permanent base or a persistent rotation of forces—to safeguard this strategic chokepoint.

Yet NATO command structures and planning do not fully reflect the imbalance of forces between the United States and Europe. They rely on the fiction that the European allies are more or less equal partners. Even military lightweights need to have important-sounding jobs and installations, making the North Atlantic Council the military version of a parliament dividing out the pork.

The resulting command structure is like a tangled pile of spaghetti. In the Baltic region alone, NATO has several multinational headquarters, one divisional headquarters split between Latvia and Denmark, another divisional headquarters in Poland, and a corps headquarters at a different location in Poland. Overall responsibility for the defense of Europe is divided between three Joint Forces Command headquarters in Naples, Italy; Brunssum, the Netherlands; and Norfolk, Virginia. But the top U.S. military commander in Europe, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. A maritime strategy for the Baltic Sea region has yet to be decided—which is just as well, because NATO has yet to create a naval headquarters for the region. Nor has the alliance drawn up real military plans for the reinforcement and defense of its northeastern members, let alone decided who would actually provide the forces and equipment in order to make them credible. Military mobility is meant to be the responsibility of Joint Support and Enabling Command, headquartered in Ulm, Germany, and originally set up as part of the European Union’s own defense policy.

A further problem is exercises: NATO does not conduct fully realistic, large-scale rehearsals of how it would respond to a Russian attack. One problem is that these are costly and disruptive. Another is that they expose the huge weaknesses of some NATO members, which can cope with a carefully scripted exercise but lack the ability to improvise. A third reason is the fear, in some countries, that practicing war-fighting would be provocative. Also lacking are detailed plans for fighting a war against Russia, covering such issues as reinforcing of front-line states, countering a Russian attack, regaining any temporarily occupied territory, and—most of all—dealing with a nuclear or other escalation. As a result, nobody is quite sure how anything would work in a crisis. Instead, another assumption reigns: that in a crisis, the United States would take over and do the heavy lifting on all fronts—logistics, intelligence, and combat.

To be fair, NATO is working on these problems, and all of them are fixable. But that does not mean that they are anywhere near being fixed. Wishful thinking remains the alliance’s besetting sin.

Worse, NATO is unprepared for the changing nature of modern warfare. Russia’s old-style assault on Ukraine is all too familiar. But the artillery bombardments and missile strikes that are grinding down Ukraine’s defenses are only part of the Kremlin’s arsenal. Its most effective weapons are nonmilitary: subversion, diplomatic divide-and-rule tactics, economic coercion, corruption, and propaganda. The most burning current example of nonmilitary warfare is Russia’s weaponizing of hunger. By blocking Ukraine’s grain exports, Russia has raised the specter of famine over millions of people, including in volatile and fragile countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Mass starvation is not just a humanitarian catastrophe, but its consequences include political unrest and mass migration, a direct threat to Europe. Yet NATO is ill-equipped to deal with this. It cannot mandate more economical use of grain—for example, by feeding less to livestock and stopping grain’s conversion to fuel. It has no food stockpiles to release to a hungry world. It cannot build new railways to ship Ukrainian grain through other routes. Nor can it insure merchant vessels that might—for a price—be willing to run Russia’s Black Sea blockade. NATO has little in-house expertise in countering Russian disinformation and almost zero influence in African and other countries susceptible to Kremlin narratives blaming the West for the food shortages that are already starting now.

NATO could acquire these capabilities. Or it could regain them: During the Cold War, the alliance had an economic warfare division and ran a program called the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls to prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring sensitive technologies. But in the strategic timeout that followed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, these agencies and their skill sets shriveled and died.

But as with NATO’s military shortcomings, identifying the problems is not the same as solving them. And given the bloc’s unwieldy structure and issues with key members, it might be wise to lower expectations about NATO returning to Cold War levels of consistent readiness and effectiveness. A more realistic vision for the alliance would be to treat it as a framework for the most capable and threat-aware members to form coalitions of the willing. These groupings already exist: The British-led Joint Expeditionary Force, for example, is a 10-country framework for military cooperation, chiefly aimed at enabling very rapid deployments to the Nordic-Baltic region in the event of a crisis. France has a similar venture, the European Intervention Initiative. The five Nordic states have their own military club, called the Nordic Defence Cooperation, while Poland has close bilateral ties with Lithuania. A similar network of bilateral and multilateral ties would greatly strengthen the alliance’s floundering presence in the Black Sea and other regions, including North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These groupings would not supplant NATO but improve action and interoperability on top of the alliance’s established structures and mechanisms.

The difficult and underlying question here is the role of the United States. Europe is, in theory, big and rich enough to manage its own defense. But its persistent political weakness prevents that. The paradox is that only U.S. involvement makes NATO credible—yet overdependence on the United States also undermines the alliance’s credibility, while stoking resentment in France and elsewhere. The task for Washington is to encourage European allies to shoulder more of the burden and start thinking strategically again, even as it retains the superpower involvement that gives the alliance its decisive military edge. That is entirely doable. But don’t expect it to happen in Madrid—or anytime soon.

### 2AC: Accession Thumper

#### Turkey blocking new members sabotages NATO unity

McFall, 22 -- Fox News

[Caitlin McFall, "Erdogan disrupts NATO unity amid Putin’s threat to European security," Fox News, 5-26-2022, https://www.foxnews.com/world/erdogan-disrupts-nato-unity-putins-threat-european-security, accessed 6-19-2022]

Erdogan disrupts NATO unity amid Putin’s threat to European security

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan negotiates political gains with NATO's expansion

Internal NATO relations have become increasingly strained following Turkey’s apparent refusal to allow Sweden and Finland into the fold, with fellow NATO member Greece becoming the latest European nation on Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan's chopping block.

Erdogan took a swing at Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis this week when he accused him of attempting to block a U.S. arms sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara.

"There's no longer anyone called Mitsotakis in my book," he told reporters following a Monday cabinet meeting.

The Turkish president also said he would refuse to meet his Greek counterpart for a previously planned summit later this year.

Erdogan’s comments came a week after the Greek prime minister met with U.S. lawmakers on Capitol Hill and urged them to consider NATO’s security when making "defense procurement decisions concerning the eastern Mediterranean."

"We are always open to dialogue. But there is only one framework we can use to resolve our differences – international law and the unwritten principle of good neighborly relations," Mitsotakis told U.S. lawmakers. "The last thing that NATO needs at a time when our focus is on helping Ukraine defeat Russia's aggression is another source of instability on NATO's southeastern flank."

The Greek prime minister did not mention Erdogan or neighboring Ankara, but his comments alluded to a long-standing spat with Turkey over alleged airspace violations.

Turkey and Greece, both of whom are NATO members, have shared a complex relationship for more than a century. But Athens and Ankara’s latest tiff amid Russia’s aggression in Europe could spell trouble for the very military alliance that Russian President Vladimir Putin would like to see dismantled.

"All nations act in their own self-interest, all the time," Michael Ryan, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO, told Fox News. "[Erdogan] defines the Turkish self-interests and he defines how they pursue it. And in this case, he views Turkey as a rising regional power, and he is pushing hard in every direction to certain Turkish prerogatives."

The NATO expert explained that the arms sale merely highlights several dynamics at play that Erdogan is juggling.

Turkey's defenses have been lagging since Washington blocked Ankara from purchasing U.S. F-35 warplanes in 2019 after it purchased the Russian-made S-400 missile system.

The White House at the time said, "The F-35 cannot coexist with a Russian intelligence-collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities."

Turkey is looking to upgrade its air defense systems with modern U.S. F-16 aircraft not only to bolster its military capabilities amid its ongoing air disputes with Greece but to aid its operations in Syria.

"It’s a cat and mouse game," Ryan said. "Congress really does have something that the Turks want."

But he added that the "Turks have something that Congress wants – which is Sweden, Finland in NATO. That may be Erdogan’s play all along."

"The U.S. can’t have Erdogan calling the shots here," European policy expert Nile Gardiner, director of The Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, told Fox News.

"All NATO allies need to be able to work together. It breaks down if you have one or two countries who are trying to derail the future of the alliance – which is what Turkey is doing," he added.

The Greek prime minister’s veiled comments to U.S. lawmakers last week may have been an attempt to dissuade Washington from securing an arms sale with Turkey amid its NATO membership blockade.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has renewed the weight of NATO’s military alliance, particularly with regard to its Article 5 stipulation that says an attack on one country will trigger a united response from all 30 member nations.

Sweden and Finland formally requested to join NATO following Russia’s aggression in not only Ukraine but amid threats Moscow has issued against other European nations.

NATO military commanders championed the move to include Stockholm and Helsinki in the alliance and said it would bolster NATO defenses and identify "vulnerabilities" in Europe’s security.

But Turkey has used the opportunity to block the NATO bids over claims that Sweden and Finland have housed individuals it considers terrorists.

"The Turks are undermining NATO by taking this reckless stance," Gardiner warned. "President Erdogan has a clear choice between either helping NATO or weakening it, and he needs to be on the right side of history here, instead of appeasing the Russians."

Some foreign policy experts have suggested that Erdogan could be acting as Putin’s "Trojan horse" to strategically block NATO’s expansion and sow turmoil within the alliance.

But the former defense secretary for Europe and NATO rejected these claims.

### 2AC: No Taiwan War

**No China-Taiwan war**

Scobell and Stevenson-Yang, 3-4

[BY: Andrew Scobell, Ph.D.; Lucy Stevenson-Yang, United States Institute of Peace, March 4, 2022, “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.” <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine>, accessed 4-2-2022]

China Is Not Russia Russia under Putin has repeatedly dispatched its armed forces for combat missions overseas to a range of countries, including Georgia, Syria and Ukraine, as well as conducted major military interventions against other states, most recently Kazakhstan (albeit at the invitation of that country’s president). Moscow has also actively supported armed groups and militias in some of these same countries and others. **Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat operations.** Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations, confrontations and even violent clashes. **But China, unlike Russia, has refrained from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries** since it invaded Vietnam in 1979. **China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions.** Whereas Russia has more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge. Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries. Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, **Xi** — at least to date — **has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power.** Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a “community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Putin, by contrast, has made no real effort to offer an alternative to U.S. global leadership beyond delivering vague grandiose declarations (often in tandem with Xi) and has offered the world little in the way of economic stimulus beyond the prospect of more energy exports and hype about the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Despite consisting of only a handful of Soviet successor states, the EAEU is touted as Russia’s answer to China’s BRI. In terms of geostrategic activism, Russia’s major multilateralist initiatives have tended to involve China. These include the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and the formation of the BRICS grouping in 2010. The former is a security community with a Central Asian focus consisting of Russia, China and four Central and two South Asian states. The latter is a loose association of some of the world’s largest “emerging economies”: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. However, Moscow’s most significant geostrategic maneuver under Putin has been to strengthen Russia’s strategic partnership with China. Both Beijing and Moscow insist that their relationship is not an alliance and their 2001 treaty of friendship — which was renewed in 2021 — does not commit either signatory to come to the defense of the other in case of military conflict. Yet, the Sino-Russian relationship is a clearly consequential alignment that has grown closer in recent years, particularly as their respective relationships with the United States have deteriorated. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has put China in a very uncomfortable position: Beijing does not want to antagonize Moscow but neither does it want to damage its relations with Washington and European capitals. Consequently, China has equivocated in its statements and actions. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has called for peace but has stopped short of condemning Russia or calling upon Moscow to withdraw its military. The lengthy joint statement of February 4, 2022, issued by Putin and Xi during the Russian leader’s visit to Beijing on the eve of the Winter Olympics, makes no mention at all of Ukraine — and China has pointedly abstained on all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Russia’s invasion. Xi appears to have asked Putin to delay any military action against Ukraine until after the Olympics. Russia’s invasion poses other difficulties for China both in terms of running counter to Beijing’s long espoused principles in foreign affairs and its adverse impact on China’s national interests in Ukraine. Russia’s actions clearly contradict China’s cornerstone foreign policy principles of noninterference in other countries’ affairs and respecting territorial integrity. Moreover, China has sizable economic investments in Ukraine and is a good customer of Ukraine’s armaments industry. In 2020, Ukraine signed the BRI cooperation agreement, which further bolstered the economic relationship between the two countries and marked Ukraine as an important partner in Beijing’s signature foreign policy and economic initiative. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine The fact that Ukraine is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was almost certainly a decisive factor in Putin’s calculus to invade Ukraine. Russia’s commander in chief knew that his invading forces would likely not have to contend with the militaries of any other countries. And if there were any lingering doubts in the Kremlin about the disposition of the most powerful member of NATO, U.S. President Joe Biden stated publicly that the United States would not send military forces to help defend Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Biden administration has taken strong steps to reinforce NATO allies in Eastern Europe and provide robust military assistance to Ukraine. By contrast, **Xi and his Politburo colleagues have long been convinced that Taiwan has the resolute support of the world’s most capable military. The People’s Liberation Army** — as all branches of China’s armed forces are known — **continues to assume that if it launches an invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. military will swiftly and decisively intervene.** The U.S.-Taiwan relationship, while technically “unofficial” due to the One China policy, has strengthened in recent years. On February 28, **the Biden administration sent an unofficial delegation of former U.S. defense and national security officials to Taiwan as a signal to China of that commitment. It remains true that the greatest deterrence to a massive Chinese military attack on the island is Beijing’s assumption that war with Taiwan also means a war with the United States.** However, there is no formal military alliance between the United States and Taiwan. The defense pact binding Washington to Taipei was formally abrogated in 1979. So why is Beijing convinced that Washington has an ironclad alliance-like relationship with Taiwan? There are at least two reasons. First, successive U.S. administrations have publicly committed themselves to support Taiwan against Chinese aggression and have regularly sold arms to the island’s armed forces. Second, although there is no language in the1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that explicitly commits the United States to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack on the island by China, many in Washington believe that such a commitment exists. While there are different interpretations as to what the TRA means, the most significant fact is that the vast majority of U.S. political and military leaders are fully convinced that this legislation binds the United States to a de facto alliance with Taiwan. China’s increased military assertiveness and greater level of armed provocations in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere around China’s periphery in recent years have only served to strengthen the conviction in Washington that the island is a staunch democratic partner worthy of U.S. support as it tries to defend tiny Taiwan against efforts by Beijing to coerce the island into unwanted unification with China. However, Taiwan, unlike Ukraine, is not a member of the United Nation. While Ukraine has ambassador-level diplomatic relations with more than 180 countries, including China and the United States, Taiwan only has full diplomatic ties with approximately a dozen countries and none of these are major powers. Yet, thanks to the TRA, Taipei enjoys robust quasi-diplomatic relations with Washington, and thanks to Taiwan’s pragmatic ingenuity, the island possesses a vibrant worldwide network of de facto diplomatic missions. Although Ukraine’s diplomatic standing is far superior to Taiwan’s, the European country’s military alliance status is less impressive — Ukraine is not a member of NATO, although it is a very active member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative. While Taiwan also has no formal military allies, the island has several close and consequential security partners, most notably the United States. China Is China and Taiwan Is Taiwan Taiwan continues to be the most contentious issue in U.S.-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan Strait is routinely identified as the most plausible location of a military confrontation between the United States and China. For Xi and his Politburo colleagues, Taiwan looms large and is prominently identified as a “core” national interest of China’s, with Xi reiterating in 2021 that “resolving the Taiwan question and realizing China’s complete reunification is a historic mission and an unshakable commitment of the Communist Party of China” and that “no one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Moreover, most Chinese citizens consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory and view the island as something worth fighting for. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has staked its political legitimacy on the ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan with China and in the meantime is working resolutely to prevent the island from becoming de jureindependent. Beijing’s preferred means of realizing unification or preventing independence is peaceful but the CCP has never renounced the use of armed force. Furthermore, the PLA’s central warfighting scenario is Taiwan and China’s military has been focused on planning and preparing for an operation against the island for decades. A Cautionary Tale? The above differences notwithstanding, Russia’s combat experience in Ukraine will have a spillover impact on how China thinks about Taiwan. If the Russian armed forces remain bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine for an extended period and/or face a prolonged and widespread insurgency, this may give Xi and his fellow Politburo members pause. If Russia’s military experiences major setbacks and perhaps even embarrassing defeats, this may make China’s political leaders think twice about the advisability of an invasion of Taiwan. After all, an invasion of Ukraine is relatively straightforward — the country is geographically contiguous to Russia, sharing an extended land border with mostly gentle terrain. By contrast, an invasion of the island of Taiwan is a far more complex operation — a successful campaign requires careful planning and coordinated execution between air, naval and ground forces. It would also involve amphibious landings in addition to considerable urban warfare — on an even larger scale than in Ukraine — including operations on rugged mountainous terrain. Certainly, the PLA will carefully study Russia’s Ukrainian campaign and draw lessons from it, much as they have studied campaigns of other major powers. Such analyses are conducted with great seriousness because China’s armed forces themselves have not fought a major war since 1979 (when Chinese forces invaded Vietnam) and have not conducted a major island landing campaign since 1950 (against Hainan Island). **One way that China’s leadership might be taking notes from Russia’s Ukraine invasion is by rethinking the risks associated with escalation.** In addition to noting the potential military embarrassment that Russia is facing, **China might be wary of the sweeping economic sanctions levied by the international community. If China were to receive similar backlash for an invasion of Taiwan, it would raise the possibility of truly crippling sanctions at a time when the Chinese economy is experiencing anemic growth and structural challenges.** In particular, the weaponization of the SWIFT payments system might give China pause. Russia has been trying to popularize a cross-border financial information transmission system, and China is committed to developing the CIPS payment network, but neither has had significant success outside Russian or Chinese borders**. Despite its flaws, SWIFT remains the most efficient system for international financial transactions for banks and being removed from SWIFT could potentially be devastating to the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the lessons of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to date are that the costs of armed aggression are high in blood and treasure, as well as strong international censure of Moscow and a resolute collective response by NATO member countries.**

## 1AR

### 1AR: ET Thumper

#### Emerging tech co-op high now

Harper, 22 -- Managing Editor of DefenseScoop

[Jon Harper, "Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO's new strategic concept," FedScoop, 6-1-2022, https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%EF%BF%BC/, accessed 6-4-2022]

Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO’s new strategic concept

Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday.

The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation.

There will be “a lot on new threats and challenges, a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, more on climate change,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told the Defense Writers Group in Washington.

### 1AR: No NATO Unity

#### Post-Ukraine unity is collapsing

Ramesh, 22 -- News9 Staff

[KV, "European unity starts fraying as Ukraine War stretches past 90 days," NewsNine, 5-27-2022, https://www.news9live.com/opinion-blogs/european-unity-starts-fraying-as-ukraine-war-stretches-past-90-days-172746, accessed 6-19-2022]

European unity starts fraying as Ukraine War stretches past 90 days

With the Ukraine conflict in its ninth week, Europe’s unity shows cracks Poland lashes out at Germany on tanks, at Norway over gas prices Turkey, Hungary and Serbia project their own nationalist agendas

Even as the US tries to put up a pan-European front against Moscow, the initial unity among the EU-NATO partners born out of the shock of Russia invading Ukraine seems to be showing chinks. Countries within the EU and NATO are scuffling with each other over bilateral issues, all of which have roots in the Ukraine conflict, or have a bearing on the ongoing war. Of broken promises The latest row is between Poland and Germany, with the former accusing Berlin of reneging on an agreement to supply Warsaw with new German tanks as compensation for Polish deliveries of Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine.

Polish President Andrzej Duda on Tuesday accused Germany of breaking an agreement to supply Warsaw with new tanks as compensation for Polish deliveries of Soviet-era tanks to Ukraine, a claim rejected by Berlin. In April, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz introduced "Ringtausch," a swap scheme under which eastern NATO partners would supply the Ukrainian army with Soviet-era tanks like the T-72 in exchange for modern western tanks from German manufacturers, such as the Leopard.

Scholz argued that the arrangement would benefit Ukraine because its soldiers and mechanics are already familiar with Soviet-era tanks, while eastern NATO countries receive an upgrade for giving up their tanks. "They (the Germans) have not fulfilled this promise. And frankly, we are very disappointed about this," the Polish president told Die Welt on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos.

"We have provided Ukraine with a large number of tanks … because we believe it is our responsibility as a neighbour," Duda told the interviewer. Tanks for Ukraine According to reports, Warsaw passed on at least 240 Soviet-era tanks to the Ukrainian military. "By doing so, we depleted our own military potential and stockpiles," he argued. The German government rejected Duda's claims. "The federal government is flabbergasted, that's how I would put it," government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit said Wednesday when asked for a reaction during a press conference in Berlin.

"There was a clear request from the Polish side to transfer state-of-the-art Leopard 2A7 main battle tanks to Poland, but the problem is that the Bundeswehr itself only has a small number — about 50 — of these tanks," he said, adding that while "more are in the pipeline, they are not standing on a car yard or factory site anywhere; they have to be manufactured." Claims and counterclaims Sticking yet another knife in Berlin's side, Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki criticised Chancellor Scholz for his refusal to travel to Kyiv. "I think he should do that," Morawiecki told Die Welt. He added, "There is nothing better than visiting the capital of the fighting nation to realise the seriousness of the situation, to get a sense of the importance of all that is happening there." Scholz has refused to travel to the Ukrainian capital for the moment, arguing that he had already gone there 10 days before the Russian invasion started, and would not go again "for a quick in and out with a photoshoot". "If [I go to Kyiv], then it's always about very specific things. And they have to be prepared," Scholz told German television RTL last week. German officials feel that Poland is trying to profit from its outward generosity to Kyiv. In lieu of the old Soviet-era tanks they have passed to Ukraine, the Poles are demanding that Germany recompense it with new, modern German tanks. The leaders in Warsaw seem to target everyone else in Europe, to flaunt that they have been at the forefront of the effort to support Ukraine, while other countries remained laggards. Their hostility to Putin has resulted in Russia cutting off gas supplies to Poland after the latter refused to pay for the supplies in rubles as demanded by Moscow. In frustration, Poland hit out at gas-rich Norway, a member of the EU and NATO, accusing it of profiteering from the war. On Sunday, Morawiecki claimed that Norway would earn an extra €100 billion ($106.9 billion) from energy sales this year due to a spike in oil and gas prices caused by the conflict in Ukraine and international sanctions on Russia, and demanded that the Nordic country share its bounty with Kyiv, while obliquely suggesting that his country too deserved a share. Morawiecki argued that Oslo shouldn't necessarily send its money to Poland, but to Ukraine. He even suggested that Polish students lobby with their Norwegian friends to pressure their country. Not profiteering says Norway Norway hit back, making it clear that it would not give in to Poland's demand. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Eivind Vad Petersson denied that his country was profiteering from the war. He argued that the excess oil and gas revenues go into the country's pension fund, also known as the Oil Fund, which was established in 1990 to make sure that this wealth serves the current and future generations of Norwegians. Norway has arguably the best public welfare programme and social safety net in the world, financed by its hydrocarbon revenues. But the pension fund has lost 550 billion Norwegian krone (around $56 billion) due to turbulence in the stock market, Petersson said. In support of Moscow Elsewhere in Europe, countries like Hungary and Serbia maintained their countries' indirect support to Moscow. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban has been a firm supporter of Putin and has refused flatly to join the sanctions of the West against Russia. He has categorically refused to abide by the EU sanctions on buying gas and oil from Russia, arguing that his country just could not do without Russian fuel supplies. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic echoed Orban's line, declaring on Wednesday that despite pressure from the EU, Belgrade would pursue its own independent policy. "Right now, there is no such possibility," Vucic informed Serbian state broadcaster RTS when asked if Serbia could impose sanctions on Moscow. Serbia has steadfastly refused to join NATO but has applied for membership in the EU. "We look out for our own interests," Vucic said. "Who knows what kind of threats we may face, but as you see, it's been 90 days and Serbia is standing by its policy, the only country in all of Europe. A small country with people small in numbers but very proud is following its own policy – not pro-Russian, not pro-Western, but its own," he pointed out. "You now talk about the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but you didn't talk that way 23 years ago," Vucic said, referring to the 1999 NATO war that led to the Serbian province of Kosovo becoming independent thanks to backing from the US and its allies. Threats from Turkey And worsening yet another headache for the EU, Turkish government spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said his government would not allow Finland and Sweden into the NATO alliance until Turkey's "concrete" security concerns regarding terrorism and sanctions are met. Kalin's remarks came at the end of five-hour-long talks between delegations from Sweden and Finland with their Turkish counterparts in Ankara to discuss their joint applications to join NATO last week. Their admission to NATO needs the unanimous consent of all 30 member states, and Turkey has threatened to block the accession process unless the two countries crackdown on groups it considers terrorists. Turkey has demanded that the two Nordic countries lift arms export restrictions on Turkey, and extradite activists of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Gulen movement (FETO) who have sought haven in the two countries. The differences within the EU that have hobbled its efforts for a unified and aggressive response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, may come to a head-on May 30 and 31, when the countries' leaders meet in a summit in Brussels. Countries express disquiet As the war in Ukraine shows signs of prolonging, voices expressing disquiet over the way the West is handling the crisis appear to be getting louder. At the EU summit, Cyprus, Italy, and Hungary are likely to table a resolution demanding a ceasefire in Ukraine and opening peace talks aimed at resolving the conflict. Tempers seem to be fraying among the allies and the verbal exchanges seem to be becoming rough, with Ukraine brusquely dismissing a suggestion by Henry Kissinger that Ukraine's borders be set at the pre-invasion status quo. Ukraine demands that the Russian forces withdraw to the pre-2014 level. Kissinger's suggestion is more in line with the Russian recognition of the rebel provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk as independent republics. Addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kissinger suggested that Ukraine give up the two provinces to buy lasting peace with Russia. He said further alienation of Russia might force it to become a strong and permanent ally of China, endangering global security. Ukrainian presidential adviser Alexey Arestovich flew off the handle at the suggestion that Ukraine barter territory for peace with Russia.

#### Domestic backlash ensures fraying unity the longer the war goes on

Ellyatt, 22 -- CNBC international correspondent in London

[Holly Ellyatt, “The West’s unity over Ukraine could be starting to crack, just as Russia’s invasion gains ground,” CNBC, 6-16-2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/16/us-europe-unity-over-ukraine-is-starting-to-crack-amid-russia-onslaught.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

The West’s unity over Ukraine could be starting to crack, just as Russia’s invasion gains ground

Western unity over the war in Ukraine is becoming more vulnerable as the conflict drags on.

One poll across Europe found a majority of people want an end to the war as soon as possible, even if it means territorial losses for Ukraine.

There is an increasing level of concern among the public in Europe, and beyond, about rising living costs.

There are increasing signs that Western unity over the war in Ukraine could be starting to crack as the conflict drags on and leaders face public discontent over rampant inflation and the cost-of-living crisis.

There are widespread concerns over how long the war could continue, with some strategists saying it has all the hallmarks of a war of attrition where no side “wins” and the losses and damage inflicted by both sides, over a protracted and prolonged period, are immense.

The U.S., U.K. and Eastern Europe appear staunch in their position that Russia must not be able to succeed or “win” in Ukraine by carving out (or reclaiming, as Moscow sees it) swathes of territory for itself, saying that could have major global geopolitical repercussions.

They have also been clear that it is Ukraine that must decide if, and when, it wants to negotiate with Russia over a peace deal. For its part, Kyiv has said it is willing to conduct talks but that it has red lines, chiefly, that it is not willing to concede any territory to Russia.

Nonetheless, there appears to be a faction within Europe — namely France, Italy and Germany — that are hoping for a peace deal sooner rather than later.

On Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his officials will have to negotiate with Russia “at some point.”

Macron and his German and Italian counterparts (who are all in Kyiv on Thursday) have all called for a cease-fire and for a negotiated end to the war, urging Russian President Vladimir Putin to hold peace talks with Zelenskyy, to no avail.

In the meantime, Ukraine continues to plead for more weapons from its Western allies, with NATO officials meeting this week in Brussels to discuss Kyiv’s urgent need for more arms.

It comes as Russia makes gains in eastern Ukraine largely as a result of its relentless artillery bombardment of the Donbas. Russian forces are making slow but steady progress in seizing more parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions where two pro-Russian separatist “republics” are located, which Moscow is intent on, as it says, “liberating” from Ukraine.

The West continues to help Ukraine; U.S. President Joe Biden said Wednesday that his administration will send $1 billion more in weapons to Kyiv, as well as another $225 million in humanitarian aid. For Kyiv, the weapons can’t arrive quickly enough.

But questions are now being asked over how long its military assistance can last, particularly if the conflict continues for years.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby was asked on CNN how much Biden is prepared to spend on Ukraine, given the inflation crisis and economic pressures the U.S. is facing at home. Data released last Friday showed the U.S. consumer price index rose 8.6% in May from a year ago, the highest increase since December 1981, with similarly elevated levels in Europe (the rate hit a 40-year high of 9% in the U.K. in April).

Saying Ukraine was “a key priority” for the president, Kirby said the U.S. will “do as much as we can for as long as we can,” reiterating that the latest promise of weapons was just one small part of the larger $40 billion in aid approved by Congress.

“This is the first tranche announced inside that $40 billion total package. So we still have quite a way to go here ... How long can all that last? How long will the war last? Nobody can be sure,” Kirby said.

“We know and predicted that the fight in the Donbas was going to be a slog, that it was going to probably stretch this war out many months. And it seems as if that’s bearing fruit now.”

Western leaders under pressure

When Russia’s invasion started on Feb. 24, the West’s unified opposition to the war, and robust response in imposing a raft of tough sanctions imposed on it, was striking.

Four months into the conflict, however, and Western leaders are increasingly coming under pressure from their electorates as the fallout from the conflict — essentially, soaring food and energy costs as a result of supply chain disruptions and sanctions on Russia — hit consumers hard.

Summing up the dilemma facing officials, Helima Croft, head of global commodity strategy and MENA research at RBC Capital Markets, said, ”‘What is the price you are willing to pay?’ has seemingly emerged as the central question of the summer, as Western leaders seek to balance their desire to support the Ukrainian resistance with their urgent imperative to tame inflation and stave off recessions.”

There appears to be a geographic dimension to this divide, Croft noted in her note Wednesday. “U.S., U.K. and eastern European leaders seem to be the staunchest defenders of the principle that Ukrainians will determine what constitutes a just peace and have expressed strong commitments to defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity.”

However, she said, “officials from continental Europe and many developing nations, on the other hand, appear more inclined to call for a compromise that will provide Putin with a ‘golden bridge’ to retreat across.”

Croft said she had recently attended meetings and policy forums where “there was an appreciable divide” between those officials calling for more fulsome military assistance for Ukraine, and “those suggesting that it is time for Ukraine to consider making concessions at the negotiating table, citing the ruinous impact of rising commodity prices.”

Europeans divided

A pan-European poll released Wednesday also indicated that Europeans’ sense of unity over the war in Ukraine could be starting to wane.

The study by the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank found an increasing level of concern among the public over the costs of economic sanctions and the threat of nuclear escalation, in particular. It was based on polling of more than 8,000 people between April 28 and May 11 across nine EU countries.

Some 35% of those questioned wanted to see an end to the conflict even if it meant Ukraine conceding territory to Russia, whereas 22% said they were more interested in seeing Russia punished for its aggression, even if it meant prolonging the war.

In addition, a growing number of people said they were worried that their governments were prioritizing the war ahead of other issues, such as the cost-of-living crisis.

“Many in Europe want the war to end as soon as possible — even if it means territorial losses for Ukraine - and believe that the EU, rather than the U.S. or China, will be ‘worse off’ as a result of this conflict,” the report on the poll’s findings, co-authored by Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev, said.

“Unless something dramatically changes, Europeans will oppose a long and protracted war. Only in Poland, Germany, Sweden, and Finland is there substantial public support for boosting military spending.”

#### NATO unity crumbling

Murray, 22 – The Telegraph

[Douglas Murray, "Nato’s united front is crumbling now that Putin has been humiliated in Ukraine," Telegraph, 5-23-2022, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2022/05/23/natos-united-front-crumbling-now-putin-has-humiliated-ukraine/, accessed 6-19-2022]

Nato’s united front is crumbling now that Putin has been humiliated in Ukraine

Western unity will be sorely tested if the conflict turns into a war of attrition with no side claiming victory

Aquarter of a year has now passed since Vladimir Putin sent his tanks into Ukraine. And the first drafts of history have already been written. Their rough conclusions seem to go along the following lines.

First, to add to Talleyrand’s famous phrase, Putin has committed both a crime and a blunder. The Russian military has shown itself to be corrupt and inefficient. The Ukrainians have shown themselves to be quite astonishingly stalwart defenders of their homeland. And the West has shown itself to be unpredictably united.

Of course, the problem with first drafts of history is that, while they may be finished with history, history is not finished with them. The conflict in Ukraine could still go in any number of directions. And while a Russian victory now looks unlikely, it is not obvious that Ukraine will emerge with its territory intact. Putin himself may yet act as dictators can when cornered. And while much of the world moves on, it is perfectly possible that the invasion of Ukraine becomes a conflict of attrition which goes on for a long time to come.

Yet it is on the question of the West that I am particularly uncertain about the first drafts currently circulating.

In some ways it is true that the Western alliances – especially Nato – have never looked stronger or more united. For 30 years, we had discussions of “whither Nato”. I took part in many of them myself. Well, the answer is the one that was staring us in the face all along. Any and all questions about the point of Nato fell apart the moment the Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine. The applications for membership from Sweden and other countries are a fine reminder of that fact. The swiftness with which the Western banking system and political sanction systems snapped into place was likewise a rather impressive moment of unity.

And yet, for all the talk of the West acting in concert, when it comes to responding to Putin’s aggression, the picture is far more fractious – and becoming more so. As far as I can see, there are three or four factions within what we might still call the Western alliance, and their various positions appear to be diverging as the war drags on.

First are those countries, including the UK, which foresaw Russia’s aggression and acted swiftly to support and arm our Ukrainian allies. It is this part of the Western alliance which is presenting the world with a vision of a united front. It is also this part that is most clear in its view that Putin must be seen to fail because, as President Zelensky put it yesterday, brute force must not be allowed to rule the world.

But other camps remain. They have not fallen into line behind the likes of the UK, as some had expected. There are those who are indebted, not to say compromised, by their recent arrangements with Russia. Despite its promises of change, the most important country in Europe – Germany – is still severely compromised, from the top of its politics down, by decades-long cosying up to Putin. For energy reasons, and much more, there is still a strong strain of thought in Berlin which disdains what the British are doing in Ukraine.

They would like to go back to the status quo ante, to be able to import Russian energy cheaply and pass those gains on to German taxpayers, the better to grandstand about green energy and much more. Their promises of rearmament have so far come to little. The prolongation of the conflict has not encouraged them to shift faster away from their prior approach, but to drag their heels and hope that the old world can be restored. Olaf Scholz, the German Chancellor, has hesitated while others have acted.

Then there is the camp of the Elysée and the president there who believes that, if he keeps a line open with Putin, he might in some way solve the conflict. It is understandable that President Zelensky and others have lost patience with President Macron. For the French leader has done more than act as a middleman and he has done more than play both sides. He has dared to give advice to the Ukrainians such as (in a speech earlier this month) warning them not to give in to “temptation of humiliation or of the spirit of revenge”.

It is easy to sit in Paris and tell Ukrainians not to feel vengeful towards Russia. The Russians tanks did not roll into the French capital. Russian troops have not been committing war crimes in French towns and cities. Nevertheless, Macron seems to be limbering up to play the negotiating middleman – the person willing to offer up a portion of another nation’s territory, in a deal which he would never accept were the territory his own.

What makes all this much more difficult now is that there is a definite sense – most especially in Washington – that an opportunity has arisen to tie down Russia. This is the final camp. These are people who seem to see Putin’s slip-up as the perfect moment to not just encourage a Russian defeat but to enable a Kremlin catastrophe, perhaps by miring its forces in a conflict that they can never win.

A weakened Putin would undeniably have certain advantages. It would be good if he is no threat for some decades to come. But this theory forgets. firstly. that a prolonged conflict is easy to wish on people from thousands of miles away, less agreeable for the citizens of the Donbas and other regions. It also ignores the other consequences of this war continuing, including the impact of Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian food exports.

And if the point of this strategy is to somehow push Putin from office, that is simply not in the West’s power, even if it was agreed to be a desirable objective. Russian history suggests that palace coups do not always end bloodlessly. The US has a plan for how to get the nukes out of Pakistan if the Islamists ever take over that country. Does anyone have a plan for how to secure Russia’s nuclear sites if there is a putsch and internecine war at the top of Russian politics? The people urging regime change in Moscow ought to hope there is such a plan.

So the Western alliance is not as cohesive as we might like to think. Yes, we have been shocked by Putin this year. Yes we have been appalled by his actions. But about the question of what to do? That remains deeply unclear. The West is united in horror. But we are divided over what to do in its face.

### 1AR: Accession Thumper

#### Turkey is disrupting NATO unity

Crowley, 22 -- NY Times Washington Bureau diplomatic correspondent

[Michael Crowley and Steven Erlanger, "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally," NY Times, 5-30-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey-nato-russia.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally

When President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey threatened this month to block NATO membership for Finland and Sweden, Western officials were exasperated — but not shocked.

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan.

After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member.

Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy.

“These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.”

Mr. Erdogan’s stance is a reminder of a long-festering problem for NATO, which currently has 30 members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have given the alliance a new sense of mission, but NATO must still contend with an authoritarian leader willing to use his leverage to gain political points at home by blocking consensus — at least for a time.

It is a situation that plays to the advantage of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who has grown friendlier with Mr. Erdogan in recent years. For the Russian leader, the rejection of Swedish and Finnish admission into NATO would be a significant victory.

The quandary would be simpler were it not for Turkey’s importance to the alliance. The country joined NATO in 1952 after aligning with the West against the Soviet Union; Turkey gives the alliance a crucial strategic position at the intersection of Europe and Asia, astride both the Middle East and the Black Sea. It hosts a major U.S. air base where American nuclear weapons are stored, and Mr. Erdogan has blocked Russian warships headed toward Ukraine.

But under Mr. Erdogan, Turkey has increasingly become a problem to be managed. As prime minister and then as president, he has tilted his country away from Europe while practicing an authoritarian and populist brand of Islamist politics, especially since a failed coup attempt in 2016.

He has purchased an advanced missile system from Russia that NATO officials call a threat to their integrated defense systems, and in 2019 he mounted a military incursion to battle Kurds in northern Syria who were aiding the fight against the Islamic State with U.S. support.

“In my four years there, it was quite often 27 against one,” said Ivo H. Daalder, a U.S. ambassador to NATO during the Obama administration, when the alliance had 28 members.

#### Turkey collapsing NATO unity

Erlanger, 22 -- NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe

[Steven Erlanger and Matina Stevis-Gridneff, "Strongmen in Turkey and Hungary Stall Unity in NATO and the E.U.," NY Times, 5-18-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/18/world/europe/sweden-finland-nato-turkey-oil.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Strongmen in Turkey and Hungary Stall Unity in NATO and the E.U.

Russia benefits as Turkey slows down Swedish and Finnish applications to NATO and Hungary continues to block an E.U. embargo on Russian oil.

Europe’s effort to stand up to Russia and Vladimir V. Putin, its president, is being slowed by two strongmen leaders insisting on the priority of their national interests and playing to domestic audiences.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on Wednesday blocked a procedural vote on NATO moving ahead quickly with the membership applications of Sweden and Finland, handed in with much publicity Wednesday morning, a senior European diplomat said.

And Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary continues to block even a watered-down European Union effort to put an embargo on Russian oil, part of a sixth package of sanctions aimed at Moscow for its war against Ukraine.

While NATO and the European Union have shown remarkable unity in their response to Mr. Putin’s war, the actions of the two authoritarian leaders show the strains building as the war drags on, peace talks appear to go nowhere, and Western sanctions are contributing to economic pain and high inflation at home, as well as in Russia.

Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Orban may be outliers in their organizations, but they are able to use the requirement for consensus in both NATO and the European Union to get their political concerns addressed by blocking the action of all the others, even temporarily.

#### Turkey won’t change their mind

Hacaoglu, 22 – Bloomberg News

[Selcan Hacaoglu, and Natalia Drozdiak, "Turkey Says Position on NATO Won’t Change in Blow to June Summit," Bloomberg, 6-15-2022, https://www.yahoo.com/video/turkey-says-position-nato-won-134859990.html, accessed 6-19-2022]

Turkey Says Position on NATO Won’t Change in Blow to June Summit

Turkey is maintaining its opposition to Sweden and Finland joining NATO unless they address its security concerns, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, leaving little hope that enlargement of the bloc could get underway by a summit this month.

### 1AR: China Answers

**China does not have the capabilities launch a full-scale war against Taiwan – not enough ships, geography prevents, and Taiwan’s infrastructure not sufficient for full-scale attack.**

**Ullman, 2/18** - Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council

[Dr. Harlan Ullman, Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, February 18, 2022, “Reality Check #10: China will not invade Taiwan,” <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-10-china-will-not-invade-taiwan/>, accessed 4-2-2022]

Despite Beijing’s longstanding desire to invade and conquer Taiwan and achieve “one China,” **China simply lacks the military capability and capacity to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan for the foreseeable future. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, to undertake an invasion, China would need over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million) that would have to be transported in many thousands of ships.** Although Beijing is unlikely to launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, given China’s strength, autocratic government, and ambitions, the United States cannot totally ignore the risk of such an attack. At the same time, however, Washington should develop an overall strategy designed to deter the most likely scenarios—such as imposing economic and financial embargoes on Taiwan, imposing a maritime blockade of the island, or attempting a regime change from within—or prevail militarily if deterrence fails. China does have many other options for pressuring Taiwan. What’s the issue? The Trump administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) was substantially predicated on preventing two faits accomplis: a Russian invasion of the Baltics and a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan. To what degree these scenarios will survive the Biden administration’s soon-to- be-released strategic review remains to be seen. The most likely outcome is that “integrated deterrence,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s term—for now more a slogan than a strategic concept that attempts a more “wholistic” all-of-government effort—will become prominent, as will a greater focus on the “deter” element rather than on “defeat” as was the last NDS. Defining what defeat means and how it would be achieved remains elusive. Some observers believe that how the United States handles the Ukraine crisis will be closely watched by China. That is true. But, as this paper argues, the Ukraine crisis will not influence Chinese decisions on whether or not to launch a full-scale amphibious invasion because, given the force demands, China simply lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. The current and former heads of Indo-Pacific Command have warned about China’s building the necessary forces to invade and conquer Taiwan, possibly by decade’s end. Given China’s long-standing determination to make Taiwan part of the mainland and achieve “one China,” a military takeover of Taiwan sounds plausible. **However, this notion is based on a fundamental misperception regarding China’s capability to launch a major amphibious assault.** If China were to launch such a military attack on Taiwan, what would that take in terms of forces and force levels? Does China possess the requisite numbers and capabilities? If not, when, if at all, might it build those forces that, if history counts, would number in the hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of ships and maritime assault vehicles? Current and past studies do not successfully or specifically address these questions. These studies focus on the how, but not on the specific manpower requirements of what would be required to carry out an invasion. The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership. **China possesses a small fraction of the necessary ships to execute a landing of that size and lacks the capacity to do so for the foreseeable future. Nor are there any current plans suggesting China is intent on procuring such a force, though that could change. Further, Taiwan is not conducive to any form of amphibious assault. A handful of landing sites on the west coast are blocked by proximate mountainous areas running the length of the 250-mile-long island, some approaching 10,000 feet in height.** Defenders could fall back using this difficult terrain to wage a guerrilla war. Moreover, **Taiwan lacks the infrastructure to support over a million invaders and their logistical needs, most of which would have to come from the mainland.** Fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels.

### AT Authoritarianism

**No impact to authoritarianism – it’s media hype**

**Leong ’19** [Ho Wai Clarence Leong holds an MSc from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism and an MA in English and Modern History from the University of St. Andrews, is the Asia newswire editor for Dow Jones, “In an age of authoritarianism, the world sees glimmers of hope,” 3-19-19, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Progress-Watch/2019/0319/In-an-age-of-authoritarianism-the-world-sees-glimmers-of-hope>]

In the past year, citizens of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ethiopia have taken to the streets to demand accountability from their governments, while voters in Malaysia and the Maldives ousted corrupt governments at the ballot box. Countries with a strong civil society or decent-sized middle class continue to push back against autocrats, even though the headlines are more often about the threats to democracy. That’s not to say democracy has nothing to worry about. A new paper published this month found that the world has been in “a wave of autocratization” since 1994, and as many as 75 democracies have seen a reversal to autocracy. Modern-day autocrats know better than to blatantly shore up power, but do so gradually and under a legal facade, making it harder to detect, researchers say. Autocrats pit authoritarianism against democracy, promoting it as a more efficient form of governance and spreading the technology that strengthens control. Social media amplifies the spread of misinformation, clouding voters’ judgment. Global freedom, which is composed of political rights and civil liberties, has been in decline for the 13th year in a row, according to a new report from Freedom House. But the same report also notes significant improvement in accountability for corruption in Angola, Armenia, and other nations. Political participation in most parts of the world has seen a continuous upward trend, reports The Economist. And while **autocrats** threaten democracies, they **are** also “**fueling a powerful counterattack**,” Human Rights Watch notes in its latest annual report. “Those who are bemoaning this authoritarian turn in the world were overstating the case,” says Steven Levitsky, a political scientist at Harvard and co-author of “How Democracies Die.” The euphoric expansion of democracy in the 1990s led to the over-optimistic belief that authoritarianism was a thing of the past, and now that expectation has been dashed, he says. But “there’s yet to emerge a real, viable, truly legitimate alternative to democracy in the world.” That doesn’t discount the fact that people are disillusioned with traditional political parties and losing confidence in democracy. But rather than disengaging from it, that dissatisfaction is driving citizens to participate in political processes, according to The Economist. Voter turnout and membership of political parties rose, reversing a downward trend. A larger proportion of the world’s population is now willing to engage in lawful demonstrations. The Economist also notes a particularly striking area of progress coming from female participation in politics. “Women have become much more active, not just in [the] U.S. but around the world,” says Steven Leslie, lead analyst at The Economist Intelligence Unit. “There is an ongoing surge of female participation in politics and in activities that are essential to democracy.” Barriers like discriminatory laws and socioeconomic obstacles are gradually being removed. In Rwanda and Ethiopia, half of the cabinet ministers are women. New legislation in Japan encourages gender parity in parliament. In the United States, the voters in the November midterms elected the highest number of women to Congress in history – though they still make up only 23.7 percent. Still, the international atmosphere has become less favorable to the expansion of democracy. Not only is the totalitarian state of China spreading its influence, but cracks are appearing in decades-old alliances such as the European Union and NATO. In the EU, both Italy and Turkey saw their rankings in The Economist’s democracy index fall by at least 10 places. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. is becoming more isolationist, analysts say. “America’s commitment to the global progress of democracy in its foreign policy has been seriously compromised,” says Sarah Repucci, senior director for research and analysis at Freedom House. In one example, when the U.S. withdrew from the council on human rights at the United Nations, it left “a huge vacuum of power,” says Rosa Freedman, a professor of law, conflict, and global development at the University of Reading in England and author of several books on the U.N. Despite the downward trends, however, **countries are forming new alliances to put pressure on repressive regimes**, reports Human Rights Watch. It points to the example of the EU and a group of Muslim-majority countries working together to create a mechanism at the U.N. to collect evidence on the ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas, which could be used in future trials of the Myanmar government. A group of Latin American countries led a resolution in the Human Rights Council to condemn the severe persecution of Venezuelans under President Nicolás Maduro. Other human rights mechanisms have sprung up in unexpected places, adds Joseph Saunders, deputy program director at Human Rights Watch. For example, the organizing bodies of big sports tournaments, such as the World Cup and the Olympics, will scrutinize the bidders and hosts’ human rights records. “These are obviously dark times,” says Mr. Saunders. “But [you] miss a large part of the picture if you don’t see the pushback that is also happening.”

**No impact to authoritarians – they’re unsustainable and can’t mobilize**

**Ganesh ’20** [Janan Ganesh was a Researcher at the Policy Exchange and is the principal political columnist with the Financial Times, “Bonhomie but no brotherhood: The authoritarian bloc that never was,” 4-22-20, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/us/bonhomie-but-no-brotherhood-the-authoritarian-bloc-that-never-was-1.4235287]

Bill Hicks, the late comic and grouch, dreamt of a political party for “people who hate people”. He just couldn’t get them to come together in the same room. The great egoist movement was undone by its central principle. I think of the skit whenever the world brotherhood of jingoist authoritarians is talked up. US president Donald Trump is in this group, with, among others, the leaders of China (Xi Jinping), Russia (Vladimir Putin), India (Narendra Modi) and Brazil (Jair Bolsonaro). Trump and Xi are superpower rivals, America cancelled India’s preferential trading status, and still the idea of a Nationalist International survives. It should not survive the coronavirus pandemic. Recent months have further teased out the differences between these conflated governments. Their domestic autocracy is real enough, but their coherence as a bloc is overstated. **Liberalism is not confronted by anything like a unified opponent**. The most vivid case in point is the US-China blame-game. It is also the least surprising. Relations were dire before the virus, and it should not be news that nativists feud more easily than they collude across national lines. World war allusions have flowed too cheaply of late, but it is hard not to think of the autocrats who mercifully failed to act in concert for long in the previous century. Leaders who believe in the separateness of nations above all else will always have trouble co-ordinating. As long as this is true, the position of **liberal democracy is less exposed than it sometimes looks**. What its enemies have in numbers and geographic spread they lack in togetherness. At present, they cannot agree on the efficacy of the World Health Organisation. The prospect of a new world order built around their shared preferences seems far off. As telling as the diplomatic schisms between nationalists is their range of antivirus policies. Mainstream governments have converged on much the same strategy, couched in much the same language. It is true enough that some were quicker than others and some were better prepared to begin with. As lives are at issue, the stragglers should be held to eventual account. Free-for-all But as time passes, what distinguishes the approaches of, say, France, Canada and Ireland, lies in the details. Given how many countries fall into the non-populist category, true outliers such as Sweden, with its minimal lockdown, are amazingly few. Compare this with the free-for-all inside the populist world. Modi has kept the second-largest population on Earth at home for a month. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, took measures against the virus relatively early. At the opposite end, there is the laxity of Trump and Bolsonaro. **The crisis has exposed how little connects these leaders** beyond a surface bonhomie. Some pretend to be serious about the business of government, some do not. A club that encompasses them all is likely to be meaningless. Notice, too, how gaping are its exit doors. By embracing a shutdown, however tardily, and not talking up a relaxation, Boris Johnson is viewed ever more as a “normal” leader. At least before his illness, the UK premier was counted unambiguously among the nativists. Scott Morrison, the Australian prime minister, after tackling the virus seriously, has undergone a similar reassignment. The nationalist team roster has thinned in a few weeks, which tells you how much rigour the idea ever had. And this is not just about personalities. There are theoretical contradictions within populism. This is a creed that cannot decide what it thinks about personal freedom. It resents technocratic bossiness while brooking no checks and balances in the protection of the homeland. Trump claims “total authority”, yes, but to loosen restrictions on people, not to tighten them (except for would-be immigrants). If this tension is evident in one leader, imagine its permutations for policy across several governments across several continents across several issues. Even according an “-ism” to such a disparate bunch is to flatter them. It is understandable that we do. We are a pattern-recognising species, and sometimes a pattern-inventing one. It is consoling to detect some kind of shape to the world. But the point is to not make the pattern itself more frightening than anarchic reality. No doubt, the momentum has been with authoritarians in recent times. The question is whether they add up to a cohesive front against democracy. An empire of illiberalism, on which the sun never sets, assumes more unity than could feasibly exist among national egoists. It just took a crisis to show it.

### AT Russia Impact

**No escalation- Putin won’t mess with NATO—**invasion is limited

**Dhanesha 2/25** (Neel, reporter for Vox. “How to think about the risk of nuclear war, according to 3 experts” <https://www.vox.com/22951004/nuclear-weapons-russia-ukraine-war-putin> Feb 25, 2022)

The main reason, Bunn said, is that the United States and its NATO allies have made it clear that they will **not send troops** to Ukraine. Without the threat of military **intervention**, Putin has **little reason** to use his nuclear weapons, especially since Russia has a staggering numbers advantage over the Ukrainian military.

“His objective is not to bring the world to **nuclear war**,” said [Paul Hare](https://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/profile/paul-webster-hare/), senior lecturer in global studies at Boston University. “His objective is to **simply** swallow Ukraine — and restore not just the [power of the] Soviet Union, but the Tsarist empire.”

#### No war- NATO backs down

**Gardner 2/23** (Frank, “Russia-Ukraine crisis: How likely is it to escalate into broader war?” <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60485766> Feb. 23, 2022)

Let's cut right to the chase here: are we witnessing the prelude to **World War 3?**

Because let's face it, that is what a lot of people are understandably asking and thinking in the light of the Kremlin's recent actions over Ukraine - actions and statements that have triggered a deluge of denouncements and sanctions from the West.

**No**. As bad as the situation on the Russia-Ukraine border is right now, it does not currently involve a direct military confrontation between Nato and Russia.

In fact, when the US and Britain watched in dismay as Russia built up a force capable of invading Ukraine, they swiftly pulled out their small number of military trainers and advisers.